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With the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, I 
Congress sought to eliminate discrimination in employment practices 
'based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 While earlier 
civil rights legislation prohibited discrimination under color of state 
law,3 or was limited solely to racial or ethnic discrimination,4 Title 
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1988». 
2. Section 703(a) of Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual's color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee,- because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). 
In addition, section 703(h) states in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, it shall not 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different 
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or 
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production 
or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such 
differences are not the result of an intention to discrimination [sic) 
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" nor shall it 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to 
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test pro-
vided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is 
not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 
Id. § 2000e-2(h). 
These provisions apply to discrimination against "nonminorities" such as 
males and whites. See infra note 237. In addition, at least one case has held 
that the Title VII prohibition against racial discrimination includes claims made 
by darker-skinned blacks against lighter-skinned blacks. See Walker v. Secretary 
of the Treasury, 472 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1990). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1988). 
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VII regulates purely private decision-making in a broad array of 
situations. s Many prior employment practices which had previously 
withstood judicial scrutiny are now exposed to a new series of attacks. 
Title VII proscribes intentional discrimination based on enumer-
ated factors. 6 Situations in which ostensibly innocent and race-neutral 
policies or practices have the effect of disfavoring minorities1 or 
other protected groups,s however, are not clearly addressed by the 
language of the statute.9 This uncertainty was addressed in the seminal 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 which set the stage for a series 
of cases that gradually defined the scope of judicial review of 
employment and promotional practices that appeared to be racially 
neutral but resulted in discrimination against minorities. 
In the wake of Griggs, many employers, private and public, 
instituted programs or policies to reduce adverse impact. Such at-
tempts to comply with the spirit of Title VII and the mandate of 
Griggs spanned the spectrum of solutions from flat quotas to so-
phisticated "assessment centers." Although the myriad approaches 
were aimed at increasing minority hiring or promotion, these plans 
have been subjected to the same scrutiny as the discriminatory 
practices they sought to remedy. . 
A recent series of Supreme Court cases has reinforced the rights 
of nonminorities to challenge "affirmative action"l1 programs and 
has created a more difficult standard for finding adverse impact. In 
Martin v. Wilks,12 the Court allowed persons who were not parties 
to prior litigation to later challenge consent decrees that resulted 
5. Title VII was also extended to cover public employment discrimination by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 
86 Stat. III (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1988». Title 
VII was not intended to incorporate the commands of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution. United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979). 
6. See supra note 2. 
7. The term "minority" is often defined to include blacks, Spanish-speaking 
persons, Orientals, Native Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts. See City of Rich-
mond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). 
8. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (ancestry 
or ethnic characteristics). 
9. See generally Sharf, Litigating Personnel Measurement Policy, 33 I. Voc. 
BEHAV. 235 (1988). 
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
11. "Affirmative action" is a shorthand reference to plans or programs which are 
designed to break down old patterns of racial discrimination and open em-
ployment opportunities in occupations traditionally closed to minorities. Al-
though discrimination may exist against minorities and nonminorities alike, 
affirmative action plans are generally limited in their scope to aiding an 
historically disadvantaged group. 
12. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
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from that litigation. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,13 the 
Court required a specific showing of past discrimination to justify a 
remedial affirmative action program. 
During the same term as Martin and Croson, the Court decided 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio}4 In Wards Cove, a majority 
of the Court confirmed a plurality decision from the prior term in 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,IS holding that an employer 
does not have the burden of proving a business necessity for the 
employment practice in question. Instead, the employer is required 
only to come forward with evidence of such a business -necessity. 
Perhaps more important, Wards Cove indicated for the first time 
that a plaintiff challenging an employment practice must show more 
than a mere statistical disparity in hiring or promotional practices. 
A plaintiff must now show a causal relationship between the chal-
lenged practice and the discriminatory outcome. 
What was not addressed by these recent decisions is the inter-
relationship of the new standards. In particular, when a challenge is 
made to an affirmative action program under the new Croson stan-
dard, must an employer who is attempting to show past discrimi-
nation which justifies its plan now conform to the more stringent 
Wards Cove causal relationship requirement? Additionally, how do 
the shifting burden requirements of Watson and Wards Cove, which 
appear to place the lion's share of the burden on the party attempting 
to prove discrimination, apply in the context of cases challenging 
affirmative action? These are questions which have not been answered 
by the courts. They are the focus of Section IV E of this Article. 
In order to fully understand the ramifications of these recent 
cases, it is important to review a number of key issues and concerns 
regarding Title VII law. Section I discusses both adverse treatment 
and adverse impact claims. A complete understanding of these two 
approaches is essential to analyzing the Croson and Wards Cove 
decisions. Adverse treatment, discussed in Section II A, involves 
intentional discrimination against a person or group. This is proved 
by showing particular acts of discrimination, by showing the individ- _ 
ual was passed over for hiring or promotion (often referred to as 
McDonnell Doug/as l6 analysis) or by showing a pattern or practice 
of discrimination. Adverse impact analysis, discussed in Section II 
B, does not rely on a showing of particularized or intentional 
discrimination. Rather, it allows for a showing of statistical disparity 
as a substitute for the evidence necessary under adverse treatment 
13. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
14. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
IS. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
16. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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analysis. Additionally, prior to the 1988 Supreme Court term, the 
employer was faced with the burden of persuasion to justify its 
actions. 
The discussion of remedies in Part III provides an important 
backdrop for the analysis in Part IV, particularly with respect to 
Croson. The court-ordered remedies discussed in Part III A provide 
an understanding of what courts are (or were) willing to do to correct 
past discrimination. Consent decrees and voluntary affirmative action 
programs, discussed in Parts III B and III C respectively, deal with 
what employers are willing to do without a court mandate, and in 
some cases without review and approval by a court. All three types 
of remedial actions are open to more significant attack after the 1988 
Supreme Court decisions. 
Part IV provides a discussion of Martin v. Wilks, Croson, 
Watson, and Wards Cove. Part IV E presents a novel and untested 
marriage of Croson's standards for establishing past discrimination 
and Wards Cove's apparent rejection of adverse impact that could 
result in a significant change in the way courts deal with the legality 
and constitutionality of voluntary affirmative action· programs. 
II. TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. Adverse Treatment 
Before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, dis-
criminatory employment actions have been subject to challenge under 
various theories of adverse treatment. 17 Instead of examining statis-
tical underrepresentation in particular employee or promotional groups, 
adverse treatment analysis is based upon allegations of particularized, 
intentional discriminatory practices. IS Three distinct forms of adverse 
treatment analysis have emerged: (1) particular discriminatory actions 
based on improper or illegal motivation; (2) situations in which no 
reason is specified but in which improper or illegal intent is suspected; 
and (3) pattern or practice. 
Particular discriminatory actions based on improper or illegal 
motivation is the standard form of adverse treatment. "The employer 
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 19 In order to establish 
a prima facie case, the plaintiff may rely on direct evidence such as 
invidious statements by the employer about a job or promotion.20 
17. Adverse treatment may also be referred to as disparate treatment. 
18. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642. 656 (1989). 
19. Harris v. Marsh. 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1278 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
20. See id. at 1279 (citing Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 
1986); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F .2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985». 
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Direct evidence may also include general racial slurs by the employer 
which may be indicative of a racially motivated employment deci-
sion. 21 
In many situations, however, direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent is not available, but it is suspected.22 In McDonnell Doug/as 
Corp. v. Green ,23 the Supreme Court devised a framework for 
analyzing adverse treatment claims where traditional indicia of dis-
criminatory intent do not exist.24 The plaintiff's initial burden is met 
by showing the following: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority;2' 
(2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer 
was seeking applicants;26 (3) that despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (4) that after his rejection, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the 
plaintiff's qualificationsY This framework is commonly referred to 
as the McDonnell Doug/as analysis. 
21. See Miles v. MNC Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1985). 
22. The "careful employer" may attempt to cloak discriminatory employment 
decisions by being circumspect in his dealings with employees, saying all the 
right things about employment decisions and providing complete documentation 
to support all employment decisions. This danger is especially present in smaller 
organizations where fewer employment decisions will be required, thereby 
making the use of statistical comparisons less effective. Even in a larger setting, 
however, the use of complex criteria and extensive categorization may make 
the detection and proof of discriminatory motives difficult. Additionally, even 
in a large organization, if the person discriminated against is a member of a 
particularly small minority group (such as a member of a small religious group 
or any ethnic group which is a small percentage of the local population), 
statistical evidence may be meager or nonexistent. 
23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
24. Although the McDonnell Douglas factors are usually used, a plaintiff may still 
make a prima facie case by presenting circumstantial evidence that gives rise 
to an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 
802 F.2d 746, 753 (4th Cir. 1986) (general pattern of racial discrimination 
within the employer's workforce); Young v. Lehman, 748 F.2d 194, 197 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (irregular or suspect employment practices), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1061 (1985). 
25. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas analysis has 
also been applied to allegations of reverse discrimination. See Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987); Parker v. Baltimore & 
O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
26. [d. The McDonnell Douglas analysis has been modified to apply to cases 
involving discharge. The application requires a showing that the plaintiff was: 
(I) a member of a protected class; (2) qualified for the position held; (3) 
discharged; and (4) replaced by a person outside the protected class. See Lee 
v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982). 
27. Lee, 684 F.2d at 773. The fourth requirement guards against claims where the 
employer simply decides to do away with a job or restructures the business in 
a way that changes the standards or job requirements. Of course, if such a 
restructuring is only a pretext for discrimination, it may still be subject to 
attack. 
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A third method that a plaintiff can use to make a prima facie 
case is to demonstrate a pattern or practice of adverse treatment. 
Rather than focusing on particular acts, pattern or practice cases 
look at a broader array of employment decisions, often considering 
the end results of hiring or promotional processes.28 Pattern or 
practice cases tend to merge with the analytical framework found in 
adverse impact cases· because both approaches are concerned with 
comparisons based on some minority status.29 Unlike adverse impact 
cases, however, in which statistical disparity establishes a per se Title 
VII violation, the disparity is only evidence of intent to discriminate 
because pattern or practice cases are still within the adverse treatment 
rubric. 30 
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer 
must come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
its action. 31 Although such a reason must be business related,32 it 
does not necessarily have to constitute a business necessity,33 Courts 
will not supplant their own judgment for that of the employer, 34 and 
28. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (challenge to 
employment system); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 
418, 438 (5th Cir. 1971) (prima facie neutral policies alleged to have been 
instruments for perpetuating racial discrimination), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 
(1972). 
29. See Segar, 738 F.2d at 1266; see also Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 
531 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (pattern or practice demonstrated by using standard 
deviation analysis). 
30. See Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d at 441-42. While the practical significance 
of such a distinction is not always evident, one clear difference is the admis-
sibility of the employer's discriminatory practices prior to the enactment of 
Title VII. Generally, pre-Act actions are not relevant in Title VII cases. See 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977); United 
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977). But see Culpepper v. Reynolds 
Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 890 n.l (5th Cir. 1970) (pre-Act discrimination may 
be considered if it is a basis for present discrimination); infra notes 84-94 and 
accompanying text (the "seniority system" cases). In pattern or practice cases, 
such evidence may be considered. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1977); Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d 
at 445-46. 
31. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1283 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
32. See Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Conso!. School Dist. No. 146, 796 
F.2d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987); Abrams v. 
Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570, 1579 (S.D. Tex. 1984), afl'd 
in relevant part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986). An exception may be a practice 
of nepotistic hiring. See Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1285 n.130 (even where such 
hiring is not done for business reason, it is not necessarily racially motivated). 
33. See Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1285; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (employer need only articulate lawful 
reasons for its actions). 
34. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978) (hiring 
system in which a foreman hired bricklayers based upon his personal knowledge 
of their work may be valid). 
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poor or erroneous subjective judgment does not, in and of itself, 
indicate that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.3s Of course, 
judicial decisions cannot be so arbitrary or irrational that they fail 
to support any legal motivation.36 Although the employer's burden 
is merely one of production,37 the employer must present evidence 
that is clear, specific, and legitimately contradicts the plaintiff's 
presumption.38 In essence, this phase is designed to frame the dispute 
with sufficient clarity to allow the plaintiff to have a full and fair 
opportunity to show a pretext.39. 
After the employer comes forward with a facially valid, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment decision in question, the 
plaintiff is called upon to show that the reason is a mere pretext. 40 
The types of evidence used may include direct evidence, statistical 
comparisons,41 a departure by the employer from normal practices,42 
and a discriminatory employment atmosphere.43 The evidence used 
in demonstrating a pretext is similar, if not identical, to the evidence 
35. See Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1290. 
36. See id. at 1285. At the stage where the factfinder is required to consider the 
employer's proffered justification for its action, the fact finder is essentially 
asked to judge the credibility of the parties, especially the employer's credibility 
regarding its motivation. If the fact finder does not believe the employer, a 
verdict for the plaintiff is required at that stage in the proceedings. Id. at 
1284. 
37. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Harris 
v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1283 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
38. See Burdine at 254-55. If the employer fails to provide an explanation meeting 
these criteria, the plaintiff should be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
39. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. As a practical matter, this information will 
almost certainly be elicited during the discovery stage of the proceedings. 
40. See id. at 256. If mixed motives are involved, the plaintiff must show that the 
legitimate reason alone would not have resulted in the same employment 
decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); c/. Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(addressing first amendment rights). 
41. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973); Warren v. 
Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 753 (4th Cir. 1986); Mozee v. Jeffboat, 
Inc., 746 F.2d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 1984); Minority Employees at NASA v. 
Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travenol Labs., 673 F.2d 
798, 820 (5th Cir. 1982). Conversely, the existence of a balanced work force, 
while not conclusive, may be evidence that no pretext exists. Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978); c/. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440 (1982) (rejecting "bottom line" parity as a defense in the context of adverse 
impact analysis). 
42. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (referring to the employer's general 
policy and practice). 
43. See id. at 804; Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). 
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that is presented to establish a prima facie case.44 If the factfinder 
is convinced after weighing all the evidence that the reasons proffered 
by the employer are a pretext,45 then the plaintiff will prevail. 46 
B. Adverse Impact 
Unlike adverse treatment cases, which concern intentional dis-
crimination, adverse impact cases are aimed at addressing facially 
neutral employment practices that have the effect of discriminating 
against minorities. As previously discussed, the seminal adverse im-
pact case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 47 in which the Supreme 
Court provided a simple and concise statement of this new standard 
for reviewing employment actions.48 
44. The presentation of evidence need not necessarily occur in two distinct steps. 
A plaintiff may use all of their "ammunition" in establishing a prima facie 
case; then the plaintiff may refer to the evidence already presented in arguing 
for a finding that the employer's reasons are pretextual. On the other hand, a 
plaintiff may make a strategic choice to withhold some evidence to be used as 
a rebuttal to the employer's justification defense. For example, if a strong 
showing of statistical disparity exists, coupled with an employer's departure 
from ordinary procedure, a plaintiff may withhold direct evidence in order to 
deflate the employer's attempted explanations. In using such a tactic, however, 
the plaintiff runs the risk that not enough evidence will be presented to establish 
a prima facie case. 
45. It is important to note that, in the context of Title VII cases, "pretext" is 
something of a term of art, and it should actually be read to mean "pretext 
for discrimination." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 
(1973». An employer who gives a false reason for its action is not necessarily 
hiding a discriminatory reason. For example, an employer could be hiding 
nepotistic practices it finds embarrassing, or it could be disguising breaches of 
a collective bargaining agreement. In Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 
717 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit required that a plaintiff 
must show not only that the employer did not rely on its proffered reason, 
but also that it relied on race. [d. at 529. Such a standard implies that indirect 
evidence alone cannot establish a plaintiff's pretext burden because indirect 
evidence would only show the first Clark requirement, not the second. Estab-
"lishing in an affirmative manner that the employer did rely on race would 
almost always require some direct evidence, which seldom exists. 
46. Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1286 (E.D.N.C. 1987). Different combi-
nations of evidence will tend to provide stronger support than reliance on a 
single source because impeachment becomes more difficult as diverse indicia 
point to the same conclusion. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338-39 (1977) (statistical evidence bolstered by 
more than forty specific instances of discrimination which "brought the cold 
numbers convincingly to life"). 
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
48. Although Griggs was the first Supreme Court case to apply the "facially neutral 
but discriminatory in effect" analysis to employment decisions, the general 
concept certainly was not new. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
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In Griggs, the employer replaced a high school diploma 
requirement49 with an aptitude test. 50 Overt policies of racial discrim-
ination which had existed in the past had ceased, and there was no 
further evidence of intentional discrimination. 5 I Noting that section 
703(h) of Title VII52 authorized employment tests that are not "de-
signed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, "53 the 
Supreme Court rejected a requirement that discriminatory intent be 
shown, but held that adverse consequences (or impact) would be 
sufficient to create a prima facie case. 54 Because there was no evidence 
that either the diploma requirement or the employment tests bore a 
"demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for 
which it was used," the Court held that Title VII prohibited their 
use. 55 
Thus, Griggs completely redefined the meaning of employment 
discrimination56 by doing away with the requirement that a plaintiff 
show intent on the part of the employer. Further, by undermining 
the notion that scoring differentials on invalidated tests may be" the 
result of educational differences, the Supreme Court held that the 
lower. scores were a result of the invalid testing and not indicative 
1'_ 
383 U.S. 663, 666, 668-69 (1966) (voting fee); Louisiana v. United States, 380 
U.S. 145, 154-55 (1965) (voter literacy requirement); McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184 (1964) (law prohibiting interracial cohabitation was held to be 
invalid under the fourteenth amendment). 
49. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427. The requirement applied to the lowest paying jobs, 
where blacks were concentrated. Id. However, prior to the institution of the 
high school diploma requirement, whites in higher paying jobs performed 
satisfactorily, thereby providing an empirical indication that the requirement 
was not job related. Id. 
50. Id. at 428. The test proved to be more stringent than the high school diploma 
requirement because it screened out approximately 50070 of the high school 
graduates. Id. at 428 n.3. 
51. Id. at 428-29. In fact, the company financed two-thirds of the tuition cost to 
help undereducated employees. Id. at 432. 
52. See supra note 2. 
53. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 (quoting § 703(h) of Title VII) (emphasis in original). 
54. Id. at 432. The Court found further support for its conclusion through 
congressional intent and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) guidelines which are used in determining the presence of discriminatory 
practices. Id. at 433-36. 
55. Id. at 431. 
56. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
(1983) (arguing that Griggs is the most important fair employment case ever 
decided); Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, 
and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy oj Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 99 (1983) (asserting that nearly a quarter of the minority labor force of 
1980 was in a better occupation than they would have been under the occupation 
distributions of 1965). 
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of unqualified applicantsY Griggs, however, left unresolved many 
questions regarding the application of appropriate standards, statis-
tical comparisons, defenses, and employers' burdens. This section 
discusses the considerable progeny of Griggs in order to more fully 
develop an understanding of the state of adverse impact analysis 
prior to the Supreme Court's 1988 Term. 
1. General Standards oj Review 
At the outset, it is important to note that Griggs dealt with a 
Title VII claim58 and that it did not discuss allegations based on 
constitutional violations. While there may be some overlap in causes 
of action when both equal protection and Title VII claims exist,59 
the standards used in analyzing such claims differ. In Washington v. 
Davis/xl the Supr-eme Court noted that, while adverse impact may be 
relevant, it was not per se unconstitutional and did not establish an 
equal protection violation.61 Thus, when discrimination claims are 
based on constitutional protections,62 Griggs-type adverse impact 
analysis is for the most part inapplicable,63 being limited to claims 
brought under Title VII.64 
57. Such an argument was attempted in Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970), but it was rejected under an analysis similar to that which emerged 
in Griggs. Penn, 308 F. Supp. at 1242. A large number of testing experts 
believe that intelligence tests incorporate racial bias. See Snyderman & Roth-
man, Science, Politics and the IQ Controversy, 83 PUB. INTEREST 79, 79-87 
(1986). 
58. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425. 
59. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
61. Id. at 239-41. 
62. The prospect of non-Title VII cases is most likely limited to cases in which 
the plaintiff fails to meet the statutory 180-day filing deadline provided in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) for Title VII claims. 
63. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264-65, 269-70 (1977). But see Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 
883 n.15, modified, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 
(1984); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972). 
64. Although Title VII now encompasses most public employment, there still may 
be some incentive to bring § 1983 claims because Title VII claims require 
exhaustion of the administrative process before the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC). See Local 179, United Textile Workers v. 
Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1972). After conducting 
its investigation, and absent any settlement or conciliation, the EEOC will 
make a finding as to the existence and extent of discrimination. Even if the 
EEOC determines that there is no reasonable cause to believe the charge of 
discrimination is true, what is commonly referred to as a "right to sue" letter 
will be issued, after which the complainant must file any federal district court 
action within ninety days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and (f)(1). Additionally, 
if no action has been taken by the EEOC within 180 days from the filing of 
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A second important consideration is that, because adverse impact 
analysis is dependent on statistical comparisons, excessive subjectivity 
in the decision-making process is, standing alone, insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case.65 However, subjective decisions cannot 
be used to mask discriminatory employment decisions,66 and a sta-
tistically disparate impact may be found when subjective decision-
making is involved.67 
Related to this consideration is the Supreme Court's rejection 
of "bottom line" analysis in determining the existence of adverse 
impact. The leading case on this point is Connecticut v. Teal,68 in 
which a promotional examination produced adverse impact within 
the purview of the Griggs analysis. 69 Before trial, the employer 
granted promotions based upon considerations of performance, su-
pervisors' ratings, seniority, and affirmative action goals in general. 
This process resulted in a black promotion rate of 22.9070 and a 
white promotion rate of 13.5%.70 The employer then argued that 
these results precluded the plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie 
case. The employer's argument was that the statistics for nonminority 
promotions were a defense to accusations of discrimination.71 
charges, a right to sue letter with no finding either way may be requested. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1). Generally, the administrative requirements do not pose 
serious impediments to pursuing litigation. For example, a finding of "no 
cause" by the EEOC is not an employer's defense to a subsequent lawsuit. 
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800-01 (4th Cir.) , cert. dismissed, 
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Although EEOC actions are not barred by prior non-
EEOC arbitration, as shown by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 47-54 (1974), the outcome of the arbitration may be accorded greater 
weight if the arbitration fully assessed the Title VII considerations. Id. at 60 
& n.21. Although EEOC conciliation measures are not required as a prerequisite 
to litigation, Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969), 
the EEOC administrative process can be quite slow and lethargic, which may 
be the prime reason why litigants may consider other avenues when available. 
65. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1307-08 (E.D.N.C. 1987). The court 
also discussed subjectivity as to adverse treatment. Id. at 1305-06. In fact, 
subjectivity may be a necessary element to some employment decisions. See, 
e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 
(1974) (mayoral appointments to a panel charged with selecting school board 
member); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(tenure of university professors). 
66. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,231-32 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(citing such things as failure to request promotions, lack of job vacancies, lack 
of motivation, voluntary refusal of training, and others as subjective decisions 
which cannot mask discrimination). 
67. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-92 (1988); Pettway, 
494 F.2d at 241. 
68. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
69. Id. at 443-44. 
70. Id. at 444. 
71. Id. at 447 n.7. 
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In rejecting this "bottom line" defense, the Court held that a 
racially balanced workforce does not immunize an employer against 
specific acts of discrimination.72 While the employer admittedly pro-
moted a more than proportionate share of minorities, this did not 
change the fact that an invalidated examination resulted in harm to 
certain individuals. 73 
In a similar vein, in Washington v. Davis,74 the lower court had 
compared the percentage of minority recruits in the District of 
Columbia Police Force (forty-four percent) to the number of minority 
twenty to twenty-nine year olds within a fifty-mile radius, the general 
population group from which applicants came.7S While that "bottom 
line" comparison indicated an absence of adverse impact, the Court 
found that the relevant comparison was between the number of 
blacks failing versus the number of whites failing. 76 In the correct 
comparison, the Court found that the failure rate for blacks was 
four times that of whites. 77 
It is also important to note that as a general rule, adverse impact 
cases will be limited to consideration of discriminatory practices that 
postdate the effective date of Title VII. In Hazelwood School District 
v. United States,18 the Court upheld an employer's defense that 
apparently discriminatory impact was due to pre-Act hiring, rather 
than post-Act practices.79 Also, in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,80 
a stewardess was illegally forced to resign prior to the effective date 
of Title VII, and subsequently she was rehired without retroactive 
seniority.81 The Court ruled that the pre-Act discrimination could not 
72. [d. at 454. This implies elements of adverse treatment by virtue of the focus 
on specific acts of discrimination, rather than limiting the inquiry to statistical 
comparisons. Yet the framework of Teal is that of adverse impact because it 
involved a standardized employment test. Therefore, while the teaching of Teal 
is that post-test manipulations to achieve bottom line parity cannot be used to 
cover over the effects that a discriminatory test has on individuals, it also 
raises questions regarding affirmative action programs that seek to artificially 
repair the effects of discriminatory practices. Cf. infra notes 281-296 and 
accompanying text (discussion regarding post hoc test manipulation). 
73. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 449-51. 
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
75. [d. at 235. 
76. This analysis invokes issues similar to those raised regarding the proper choice 
of population groups to be compared. See infra notes 100-107 and accompa-
nying text. 
77. [d. at 237. The Supreme Court reversed based on fifth amendment and 
constitutional issues and not because of any Title VII violations. [d. at 242. 
78. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
79. [d. at 310. 
80. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
81. [d. at 554-55. 
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be used as a basis for the claimed present harm of loss of seniority. 82 
An exception to the general rule is where pre-Act discrimination 
persists in a more overt form after the effective date of Title VII's 
application. 83 
A caveat exists regarding pre~Act considerations involving sen-
iority systems that predate the effective date of Title VII's application 
and which have the effect of perpetuating present discrimination. 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States.84 In Teamsters, employment benefits, 
such as bidding rights and layoff protections, were determined by 
the employee's seniority in his particular position, either as a "city 
driver" or in the financially more desirable position of "line driver. "8S 
If a city driver transferred to a line driver position, his seniority date 
for purposes of bidding rights and layoff protection began anew.86 
While these provisions affected minorities and non-minorities alike, 
pre-Act hiring practices resulted in a disproportionate denial of line 
driver positions to blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons.87 
The Supreme Court clearly recognized the discriminatory effect 
of this pre-Act seniority system.88 The Court, however, further noted 
that § 703(h) of Title VII afforded seniority systems some degree of 
immunity.89 After a review of the section's legislative history,90 the 
Court concluded that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system 
which existed prior to the effective date of Title VII and which 
perpetuated past inequities would not be struck down absent a 
showing that it was intended to serve a discriminatory purpose. 91 
82. Id. at 560. This decision was founded in part upon the fact that the plaintiff 
did not file a complaint based upon her earlier required resignation within a 
timely manner. 
83. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1986) (applying "multiple 
regression analysis" to pre-Act factors and concluding that the discrimination 
had continued past the effective date of the Act); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
359 F. Supp. 1187, 1195-96 (D. Md.), modified sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 
486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that discrimination in the 1950s was a 
valid consideration when examining discrimination which was continuing into 
the 1970s). 
84. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
85. Id. at 343-44. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. The plaintiffs argued that, as a result of the pre-Act system, they were 
"locked" into less desirable jobs because their only other choice was to transfer 
and lose their seniority. Id. 
88, Id. at 349-50. 
89. Id. at 350. For text of § 703(h), see supra note 2. 
90. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 350-52. . 
91. Id. at 353-54; see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277-79, 288-
89, 291-93 (1982) (remanding the case for further determination as to whether 
sufficient facts showing discriminatory intent existed); American Tobacco Co. 
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1982) (applying the same intent requirement 
to post-Act seniority systems). 
1991) Causation in Employment Discrimination 321 
Thus, consistent with the dichotomy between pattern and practice 
adverse treatment and adverse impact, seniority systems which per-
petuate past adverse impact will be upheld, but those which perpet-
uate past intentional discrimination will not. 
An exception to the rejection of seniority systems which perpet-
uate past discrimination may be found in cases where a particular 
job was a prerequisite to advancement. In Cotton v. Hinton,92 the 
Fifth Circuit upheld a requirement that an employee must hold a 
specified "prerequisite job" before filing for a "critical job" because 
training necessary for "critical jobs" was obtained from the "pre-
requisite jobs."93 However, courts will not automatically defer to 
such claims. Instead, the court will inquire into the legitimacy of a 
business requirement that the job serve as a prerequisite.94 
2. Establishing Adverse Impact 
Within the parameters of these general standards, the next 
inquiry addresses what evidence is required to show adverse impact 
of a sufficient degree to establish a -prima facie case. The most 
common way of showing adverse impact is to examine hiring or 
promotional populations in order to determine whether the EEOC's 
"four-fifths rule" has been met. The "four-fifths rule" states that 
a selection device has an adverse impact if a selection rate for any 
race, sex, or ethnic group is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) 
of the rate of the group with the highest selection rate.9S 
92. 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977). 
93. [d. at 1333. The court upheld the system notwithstanding the fact that 109 of 
183 employees in prerequisite jobs were black. [d. 
94. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(rejecting a claimed business purpose because there was no logical line of 
progression between job categories); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal 
Co., 451 F.2d 418, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting managerial convenience as 
a sufficient justification), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). 
95. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607, 
1607.4(D) (1990) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines]. Section 1607.4(D) states: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than 
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the -
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection 
rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are sig-
nificant in both statistical and practical terms or where a user's actions 
have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, 
sex, or ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate may not 
constitute adverse impact where the differences are based on small 
numbers and are not statistically significant, or where special recruiting 
or other programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates 
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The comparison is not between the number of non minorities 
and minorities passing (or promoted or hired), but between the 
percentage of nonminorities passing and the percentage of minorities 
passing.96 Knowing that 100 whites pass and ten blacks pass is 
insufficient information to apply the "four-fifths rule." One must 
also know the total of each group that took the test. If 1000 whites 
and 115 blacks took the test, given the above pass rates, the white 
pass rate is 100/0 and the black pass rate is 8.690/0. Since 8.69 is 
nearly 87% of 10, it meets the four-fifths (or 80%) requirement. 
However, if 1000 whites and 103 blacks took the test, the white pass 
rate is still 10%, but the black pass rate is now 7.69%. Since 7.69 
is less than 77% of 10, it does not meet the four-fifths requirement. 97 
The "four-fifths rule" does not require strict adherence, and it is 
not legally binding.98 Rather, it is a "rule of thumb" that must be 
considered in light of such confounding factors as sample size and 
actions which might have discouraged minority applications.99 
Population statistics are another factor used to determine if 
minorities are adversely impacted in the work force. The problem 
with the use of population statistics, however, is deciding which 
population group is appropriate for comparison. For example, should 
all females in the United States be compared or is the proper focus 
[d. 
to be atypical of the normal pool of applicants from that group. 
Where the user's evidence concerning the impact of a selection pro-
cedure indicates adverse impact but is based upon numbers which are 
too small to be reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the 
procedure over a longer period of time and/or evidence concerning 
the impact which the selection procedure had when used in the same 
manner in similar circumstances. elsewhere may be considered in 
determining adverse impact. 
96. Passing or not passing may not always be the relevant criterion. A ranked 
examination list that is nondiscriminatory as to its pass rate, but which clusters 
minorities near the bottom of the list, may be discriminatory. See Kirkland v. 
New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 
1983) (although an 880/0 pass rate of minorities and a 92% pass rate of 
nonminorities satisfied the "four-fifths rule," there was a prima facie case of 
discrimination because the rank-ordering system of the applicants who passed 
the test resulted in only 9.3% of the minorities getting promoted), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1005 (1984). 
97. For application of the rule, see, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 
159-60 & n.1O (1987) (four-fifths requirement not satisfied); Guardians Ass'n 
v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1980) (four-fifths requirement 
not satisfied), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Friend V. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 
61, 66 (4th Cir. 1978) (four-fifths requirement satisfied). 
98. See Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986). 
99. [d.; see also infra note 106 (actions discouraging minority applications); infra 
note 132 (sample size). 
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on the city, county, or state where the job exists? This dilemma is 
not easily resolved and the courts have not, and probably cannot, 
set forth a general standard. Usually, this decision will depend upon 
the case in question. When the alleged discriminatory factors are 
easily identified by demographic data, however, general population 
statistics usually will pose no problem. 
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,lOo the Supreme Court held that height 
and weight requirements for correctional counselors in Alabama 
prisons had a discriminatory impact on females. 101 The Court noted 
that although women comprise 36.89070 of the State of Alabama's 
labor force, only 12.9070 of the correctional counselor positions were 
filled by women. 102 The Court also noted that the height requirement 
would eliminate 33.29% of the women in the United States from 
consideration, compared with only 1.28% of the males, and that the 
weight requirement would eliminate 22.29% of the women, compared 
with 2.35% of the males. 103 
Similarly, in League oj United Latin American Citizens v. City 
oj Santa Ana,l04 the city had imposed a height requirement which 
adversely affected Mexican-Americans. lOS Although the height require-
ment had been suspended, the court feared that its prior use as a 
threshold requirement may have served as a deterrent to applications 
by Mexican-Americans. 106 Therefore, the court relied on general city 
population statistics in holding that the height requirement was 
discriminatory. 107 
100. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
101. Id. at 326-27, 331. The Court ultimately upheld the requirements because they 
represented a bona fide occupational qualification. /d. at 334-37. The require-
ments imposed a minimum height of five feet two inches and a minimum 
weight of 120 pounds. Id. at 324 n.2. 
102. Id. at 329. 
103. Id. 
104. 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
105. Id. at 879, 882. 
106. Id. at 893-94. Other courts have considered the prospect that a comparison of 
hiring rates may be skewed by the fact that minorities may have become 
discouraged by past discriminatory practices, and therefore simply do not apply 
for the jobs in question. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 363-64, 367-69 (1977); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 
F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Conversely, it should be noted that easier access to the hiring process by 
referrals from friends and relatives does not necessarily violate Title VII. 
Hayes, 456 F.2d at 119-20. Such factors could skew statistics in the opposite 
direction, creating an appearance of adverse impact in applications that may 
not exist. Cj. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 95 (special recruiting programs 
that result in an atypical pool of applicants do not constitute adverse impact 
under the "four-fifths" rule). 
107. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 410 F. Supp. at 882, 896-98. The court 
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One commentator has urged a more generalized reliance on 
population statistics as a whole108 because the comparison of pass 
rates of minorities and nonminorities is statistically insufficient. 109 
Although such an approach may be feasible in cases such as Dothard 
and League of United Latin American Citizens, it would be difficult 
to use, if not unworkable, when dealing with tests administered· for 
a particular job. Such an approach could require administering the 
test on a random sample,IIO and the "randomness" of the sample 
would then be open to attack. III Further, those taking the sample 
test may be uninterested, or unable to meet some nondiscriminatory 
job criteria, thereby skewing the results. 
Assuming the propriety of general population comparisons re-
garding employment tests, such comparisons may be particularly 
problematic when the selection is highly discretionary and involves a 
small number of people. In Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational 
Equality League,1I2 a challenge was made to the mayoral selection 
of a panel charged with the selection of school board members. 1I3 
Nine of the panel members were the highest ranking members of 
various city organizations. 1I4 The plaintiffs sought to compare the 
minority representation on the panel (15070) to the city's black pop-
ulation (34%) and black student population (600/0).115 The Supreme 
Court found that these comparisons were irrelevant and th.at the 
relevant comparison was between the minority representation on the 
panel and the minority representation of the highest officials of the 
relied on the city population statistics rather than the entire county statistics 
because the city was the relevant community serviced. The court also looked 
at such factors as the need to achieve racial balance, the increased efficiency 
of hiring city residents, and the increased stake city residents had in the area 
they would be servicing. Id. at 896-97. The court relied on general population 
statistics, rather than labor force statistics, because general population statistics 
are sufficient to create a prima facie case. It is the burden of the defendant 
"to define the job and its qualifications, and to determine the quality of the 
testing techniques ... to determine the qualifications of the applicants." Id. 
at 897-98; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23 (using a comparison of 
the general minority population statistics to find discriminatory exclusion of 
blacks from the preferred "line driver" positions). 
108. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof 
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 794-95 (1978). 
109. Id. at 805-06. 
110. Of course, it would be impossible to obtain absolute statistics without requiring 
virtually the entire population to take the test. 
Ill. Paradoxically, the Griggs adverse impact analysis could be used to attack the 
sample. 
112. 415 U.S. 605 (1974). 
113. Id. at 606-07. 
114. Id. at 607-08. 
115. Id. at 611. 
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city organizations included in the categories from which the mayor 
made his choices. 1l6 
Another method of establishing a statistical demonstration of 
adverse impact is standard deviation analysis. Standard deviation 
analysis accounts for the probability that any given statistical com-
parison could be the result of chance. In Castaneda v. Partida,1l7 a 
grand jury selection case, the Court provided a concise explanation 
of the application of standard deviation analysis: 
If the jurors were drawn randomly from the general popu-
lation, then the number of Mexican-Americans in the sample 
could be modeled by a binomial distribution. . . . Given 
that 79.10/0 of the population is Mexican-American, the 
expected number of Mexican-Americans among the 870 
persons summoned to serve as grand jurors over the 11-
year period is approximately 688. The observed number is 
339. Of course, in any given drawing some fluctuation from 
the expected number is predicted. The important point, 
however, is that the statistical model shows that the results 
of a random drawing are likely to fall in the vicinity of the 
expected value. . . . The measure of the predicted fluctua-
tions from the expected value is the standard deviation, 
defined for the binomial distribution as the square root of 
the product of the total number in the sample (here 870) 
times the probability of selecting a Mexican-American (0.791) 
times the probability of selecting a non-Mexican-American 
(0.209). . . . Thus, in this case the standard deviation is 
approximately 12. As a general rule for such large samples, 
if the difference between the expected value and the observed 
number is greater than two or three standard deviations, 
then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would 
be suspect to a social scientist. The II-year data here reflect 
a difference between the expected and observed number of 
Mexican-Americans of approximately 29 standard devia-
tions. A detailed calculation reveals that the likelihood that 
such a substantial departure from the expected value would 
occur by chance is less than 1 in [10 to the 140th power).li8 
Because this approach necessarily involves the comparison of 
populations, the appropriate type of population must be chosen at 
the outset. In Castaneda, where parameters for prospective jurors 
116. Id. at 620-21. 
117. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
1I8. Id. at 496-97 n.17 (citations omitted). 
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were relatively few, 119 the analysis could have been flawed if a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory requirement skewed the populations 
involved. 120 For example, if jurors were required to be citizens who 
had reached the age of majority, and a highly disproportionate share 
of the relevant minority population comprised either aliens or minors, 
then standard deviation analysis based on general population groups 
could be flawed. Therefore, the analysis should be limited to the 
percentage of the relevant minorities meeting the legal requirements. 
Standard deviation analysis is not limited to situations in which 
selection is based on demographic requirements. It may also be used 
to ascertain adverse impact regarding hiringl21 or promotional l22 prac-
tices, as well as any other employment-related actions. 123 Particularly 
where employment or promotional tests are concerned, an analytical 
cousin of standard deviation known as standard error of measurement 
may prove useful. Like standard deviation, standard error of meas-
urement is designed to predict the likelihood that chance may have 
resulted in the outcome. Standard error of measurement, however, 
is particularly well suited for evaluation of testing procedures where 
elements of reliability and validity come into play. 124 
Still another method of comparison, which is used less often 
than the others, is the multiple regression analys~s. This method 
119. A prospective juror was required to "be a citizen of Texas and of the county, 
be a qualified voter in the county, be 'of sound mind and good moral character,' 
be literate, have no prior feiony conviction, and be under no pending indict-
ment, 'or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony.'" Id. at 485 
(quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 19.08 (Vernon 1977». 
120. Such an analysis may at times beg the question because the very factors which 
arguably delimit standard deviation analysis may themselves be unjustified. For 
example, if there was no legitimate justification for requiring jurors to be 
voters, then the requirement could operate to discriminate against Mexican-
Americans if a disproportionately high number of Mexican-Americans are not 
registered voters. The fact that the result is coincidental should not matter 
under adverse impact analysis. The conclusion of this consideration is that if 
an illegitimate factor which may be neutral on its face, but which has a 
discriminatory effect, can be isolated, standard deviation analysis may be used 
to demonstrate the impact of that factor. 
121. To the extent that the standard deviation analysis is based on valid population 
comparisons, its universality· would achieve the kind of general population 
comparisons urged by Shoben. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
122. Standard deviation analysis may be best tailored for application to promotional 
tests because all applicants are usually considered to be "qualified" for the 
job, and the tests are used as a ranking device. Therefore, the confounding 
factors that may be found in general populations are not present. The same 
may be said of the application of the "four-fifths rule" to promotional 
examinations. 
123. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 536 n.7 (5th Cir. Unit 
A 1982) (pattern or practice of adverse treatment). 
124. For a more in-depth discussion of standard error of measurement, see infra 
text accompanying notes 219-226. 
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"measures the discrete influence independent variables have on a 
dependent variable such as salary levels."12s Independent variables 
include race, age, education level, and experience levels. 126 The proper 
choice of independent variables determines the validity of the process 
because if a legal and relevant variable is overlooked, the process 
may yield a false result. 127 
Once the independent variables have been selected, a computer 
"measures the impact of each [independent] variable upon the de-
pendent variable by holding all other [independent] variables con-
stant. "128 In one case the court found that salary variations ranging 
from $1119 to $1934 per year were attributable to race. l29 The court 
indicated that the odds of this discrepancy occurring by chance were 
well over one in 1000, and the court considered a one-in-twenty ratio 
as statistically significant. 13o 
3. Defenses and Shifting Burdens 
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defen-
dant can attempt to demonstrate that the plaintiff's statistics are 
flawed \31 or that they involve a statistical base that is too small to 
be meaningful. 132 Absent such a "threshold" defeat of the plaintiff's 
case, the employer must justify the employment practice. The Su-
125. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1115 (1985). See generally Finklestein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple 
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 
702 (1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. 
REv. 737 (1980). 
126. Segar, 738 F .2d at 1261. 
127. [d. Although the analysis does not have to include all possible independent 
variables, the failure to include variables will affect the probativeness of the 
analysis. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,400 (1986). 
128. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1261. The analysis will also measure the probability that 
the result could occur by chance and the degree to which the procedure as a 
whole explains observed disparities in the dependent variable. [d. 
129. [d. at 1262. 
130. [d. The defendants attempted to use what they called "cohort analysis," which 
compared salary increases and promotions of employees who started the same 
year and at the same grade level. [d. at 1263. This approach was rejected 
because it did not account for other variables and the statistical sample was 
too small. [d. at 1264. 
131. The error may be due to such factors as erroneous collection of data, tabulation 
errors, and failure to follow scientifically acceptable procedures. See Watson 
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996-97 (1988) (O'Connor, J., 
plurality); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). 
132. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-
21 (1974) (thirteen-member panel of high ranking officials is too small for 
statistical purposes); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 
n.4, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (Spanish surnamed 
applicants for accounting test too small for statistical purposes). 
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preme Court has made clear that the employer's burden is one of 
production only and that the burden of persuasion remains with the 
plaintiff at all times.133 The plaintiff can dispute the justification by 
arguing that it is a pretext for discrimination. 134 
Employers are generally successful in demonstrating the business 
necessity of specific pre- or post-employment circumstances such as 
an employment prerequisite. 13s Acceptance of such nontest criteria is 
extremely likely to occur in cases involving police. In Davis v. City 
0/ Dallas, 136 the Dallas Police Department imposed: (1) an educational 
requirement of forty-five college credits; (2) a requirement that a 
candidate not have used marijUana recently and not have used it 
excessively at any time; and (3) a requirement that a candidate have 
no more than three hazardous traffic violations in the preceding 
twelve months and no more than six hazardous traffic violations in 
the preceding twenty-four months.137 Although these standards had 
an adverse impact on blacks, the court held that they had a "manifest 
relationship" to employment needs. 138 Specifically, the court found 
that the education requirement was valid because the position of 
police officer is a professional position and involves significant public 
responsibility.139 The court then found that marijuana use was em-
pirically shown to indicate a tendency toward future use, a decreased 
willingness to enforce the laws and a decrease in public trust. l40 As 
to a hazardous driving record, the court found it to be predictive of 
future problems. 141 In addition, Davis noted that when the risk of a 
wrong employment decision could result in further significant negative 
results, the employer's burden is lessened. 142 
The greatest debate in adverse impact cases centers around hiring 
and promotional tests.143 Courts will often take a deferential approach 
133. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). 
134. Id. at 660. 
135. See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding 
criteria considering prior garnishment of an applicant's wages and the number 
of vehicular accidents in which the applicant had been involved). But see supra 
notes 100-107 and accompanying text. 
136. 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 207-08. 
139. Id. at 211. Davis used empirical studies to support its conclusion. Id. at 219-
22. 
140. Id. at 224-25. 
141. Id. at 225-26. 
142. /d. at 213 (quoting Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th 
Cir. 1972»; see also New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 
n.31 (1979) (methadone users prohibited from employment as transit workers). 
143. See generally Bentz, Comments on Papers Concerning Fairness and Employ-
ment Testing, 33 J. Voc. BEHAV. 388 (1988); Gottfredson & Sharf, Foreword, 
Fairness in Employment Testing, 33 J. Voc. BEHAV. 225 (1988); Schmidt, 
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to review of such tests.l44 The EEOC Uniform Guidelines set forth 
standards for judging these tests. 14S Because the Uniform Guidelines 
are rarely satisfied, however, courts will often rely on the general 
concepts of the Guidelines rather than implementing a strict appli-
cation. 146 
Generally, courts have validated tests in several ways.147 One 
method is to show that the test is content valid. ·Content validity 
seeks to measure a candidate's knowledge, skill, and abilityl48 after 
Problems of Group Differences in Ability Test Scores in Employment Selection, 
33 J. Voc. 8EHAV. 272 (1988). 
144. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (university 
tenure); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (accountants); United States v. South Carolina, 
445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977) (national teacher examinations), aff'd, 434 
U.S. 1026 (1978). 
145. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1607.14. Since the standards are too 
lengthy to set forth in their entirety, some generalized statements of the 
standards follow. Validity studies should be based on a review of information 
of the job that includes a job analysis. § 1607.14(A). Criterion studies should 
measure important or critical work behavior based on a representative sample, 
and a statistical relationship between selection procedure scores and criterion 
measures should be computed. § 1607.14(8)(3)-(5). Such selection procedures 
should be reviewed for their operational feasibility, including proper cut-off 
scores or appropriateness for rank ordering. § 1607.14(8)(6). Interestingly, 
subsection 8(8) includes "fairness" as a consideration, which is defined in 
terms of adverse impact on members of one race, sex, or ethnic group. 
Therefore, a test may be per se invalid if it has adverse impact, thus rendering 
the concept of validity studies meaningless. Content validity studies may be 
used if it is technically feasible to measure knowledge, skills, or abilities which 
are necessary prerequisites to successful job performance. § 1607. 14(C)(1). 
Again, job analysis, a development of selection procedures, and the use of 
representative samples are required. § 1607. 14(C)(2)-(4). If the scores will be 
used to generate ranked lists, a relationship between a higher score and better 
job performance must be shown. § 1607. 14(C)(9). Construct validity, which 
requires empirical validation, may be used if important work behaviors are 
identified, and a relationship to the procedure and job performance, as meas-
ured by these work behaviors, can be shown. § 1607.14(0)(1)-(3). 
146. See Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 
630 F.2d 79, 92-93, 110 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). 
147. When discussed in the literature, and especially in judicial opinions, the 
procedures are often called by various names and sometimes intermingled. The 
best approach is simply to determine how the procedure works, as discussed 
herein, and evaluate it accordingly. The names used herein are those used by 
the EEOC Uniform Guidelines. 
148. The test should not measure skills that will be learned on the job because this 
does little to predict a candidate's ability. Instead, it only finds those who 
possess some prior similar experience, often with a result that causes adverse 
impact. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 434 (1975); 
Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 92. This can sometimes create a dilemma, 
especially under the EEOC Uniform Guidelines. A test that is too general may 
330 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 20 
identifying the factors necessary for job performance; the court then 
ascertains whether the test accurately measures these factors. 149 The 
test must provide a meaningful scoring mechanism; otherwise, its 
predictive value may be insufficient to meet validity requirements. ISO 
A second approach is criterion validity. Instead of measuring 
more general skills, this method seeks to measure actual tasks that 
will be performed on the job.lSI Because such an approach measures 
these specific attributes, it is especially prone to testing abilities that 
will be learned on the job. Criterion validity, therefore, should be 
limited to jobs in which specific, narrowly defined skills are in-
volved. ls2 
not be job-related, but a test that is more specific may actually be measuring 
skills that will be learned on the job. Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 92-93. 
149. See, e.g., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. Unit A 
1982) (content valid Early American History test can cover the Boston Tea 
Party but not the bombing of Pearl Harbor); Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 
83-84, 89 (employer performed extensive job analysis and identified conduct 
that was related to and representative of the job of a policeman); Jackson v. 
Nassau County Civil Servo Comm'n, 424 F. Supp. 1162, 1171-72 (1976) (test 
need not go into minute detail: adequate measurement of general abilities is 
sufficient). See generally Bartholet, Application oj Title VII to Jobs in High 
Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 945, 1016-17 (1982). 
150. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 95, 100-06 (rank ordering may be 
rejected if the lines drawn by the test procedure are so minor in light of the 
test's predictability that they may yield misleading results). 
151. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1607. 14(B). 
152. The tests consider factors which are the opposite of general traits (such as 
intelligence, aptitude, judgment, and leadership). The archetype of a skill-
specific examination is a typing test, where the only skills measured are speed 
and accuracy. Such a test for a word processor would be almost impervious 
to an adverse impact attack because it bears a manifest relationship to the job. 
However, where a broad array of skills and abilities is required, such as with 
the police officers in Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 89, 95, 98, the Court will 
accept approaches that test representative job duties with a procedure or 
methodology that is similar to the job process. One such approach is an "in-
basket" exam, where a candidate may be asked to deal with an average day's 
problems and tasks. If important aspects are measured and the procedure is 
not too unrelated to the job, the test will likely pass muster for jobs involving 
complex tasks. Id. at 99. 
A similar approach involves the so-called "assessment centers," in which 
candidates are observed in situations which are intended to simulate real life 
conditions they would encounter on the job. In Firefighters Institute Jor Racial 
Equality v. City oj St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 938 (1981), candidates for promotion to the rank of captain were shown 
a simulation slide show. Then candidates were required to evaluate the situation, 
to present a firehouse lecture, and to interact with an interviewer playing the 
part of a firefighter in a personal confrontation. Id. at 360. However, this test 
failed because the defendant failed to present validation studies or other 
empirical evidence of validity. Id. at 360-61. 
1991] Causation in Employment Discrimination 331 
A third method of test validation is construct validation. This 
is an empirical approach that attempts to demonstrate that, in 
practice, tests that purported to choose the best candidates did in 
fact choose the best candidates. ls3 The advantage of such a procedure 
is that, if a proper data base exists, its results may be the most 
apparent, especially to the layman untrained in psychometrics. Ob-
taining the proper data base is what presents the most problems in 
this type of validation. The Uniform Guidelines warn that this method 
is extremely difficult, time consuming, and costly.IS4 A validity pro-
cedure that demonstrates that the people chosen perform well only 
provides half of the relevant information because there is no showing 
that those not chosen would not have performed just as well, or 
even better. For example, suppose a test of 100 persons chooses ten 
and eliminates· ninety. To conduct a pure construct validation study, 
all 100 persons should be placed in the job in question. If the ten 
who passed perform demonstrably better than the ninety who failed, 
then the test is empirically validated. As a practical matter, such a 
study can seldom be performed in the work place and is relegated 
to controlled studieslss in a clinical setting. ls6 
Although there are no hard and fast standards for judicial review 
of employment tests, some generalizations are possible. General ap-
titude tests will almost always fail because they do not closely 
duplicate actual duties to be performed or measure important job 
characteristics. ls7 Likewise, the requirement of a high school diploma 
153. See generally Uniform Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1607.14(0). Validation may 
be accomplished to some measure by comparing scores with subjective super-
visory ratings, provided that such ratings are precise enough to adequately 
measure what the tests purport to measure. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 432-34 (1975). 
154. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1607.14(0)(1). 
155. Controlled studies could require content or criterion validation themselves. [d. 
156. See Bartholet, supra note 149, at 1018. The closest a workplace study may 
come to achieving construct validity is to examine success rates or probationary 
employees as compared to their relative ranking on the test in question. ct. 
Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 90 n.lO. Such an approach only validates the 
ranking of the group selected, and requires an assumption that the ranking 
which resulted in nonselection of those with lower scores is similarly valid. 
While there may be no particular reason to believe there would be a breakdown 
in the validity of lower rankings, if the test does incorporate a racial bbs that 
tends to cluster minorities near the bottom, then the validation procedure may 
never have the opportunity to prove the test empirically wrong or right. 
157. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Servo 
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1338 (2d Cir. 1973) (written hiring examination for 
police officers), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Arrington v. Massachusetts 
Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358-60 (0. Mass. 1969) (general 
aptitude test); Bartholet, supra note 149, at 952 (noting that the late sixties 
and early seventies saw a wholesale outlawing of employment tests). But see 
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will often be rejected because any required reading or writing re-
quirements may be demonstrated absent a diploma. 158 
Various considerations may save a test of questionable validity 
from complete rejection. If the test is only one factor considered 
when making the employment decision, or if the process includes 
waiver provisions, then courts may be more willing to accept the 
criteria in question. 159 The degree of adverse impact or the harshness 
of the decision (Le., nonpromotion versus discharge) may also be 
relevant considerations. l60 
The final step in the analytical process, which may permit the 
plaintiff to prevail even in the face of a validated selection procedure, 
allows the plaintiff to show that an equally effective procedure would 
result in less adverse impact. 161 It is unclear what a plaintiff must do 
to meet this requirement. This is apparent in light of judicial state-
ments that the employer is not required to choose a procedure with 
the least adverse impact,162 and may even consider such items as 
monetary concerns when choosing a procedure. 163 
III. REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Remedial action in the face of established or suspected employ-
ment discrimination may be· court-ordered, pursuant to a judicial 
finding or by consent of the parties. While a court has the power to 
enjoin the use of a discriminatory process,l64 its powers do not end 
there, thus allowing for a broad range of remedial relief. Likewise, 
parties will often enter into consent decrees in which, at some point 
after the institution of litigation, they will agree to the implementation 
and/or discontinuation of particular practices or procedures. How-
Gottfredson, Reconsidering Fairness: A Matter of Social and Ethical Priorities, 
33 J. Voe. BEHAV. 293, 295-301 (1988) (supporting "g-factor" tests, which 
purport to measure general intelligence). 
158. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 237 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
159. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.13 (1977) (waiver 
provision); Schmidt, supra note 143, at 283-85 (supervisor ratings and oral 
interviews as other factors). 
160. See Seymour, Why Plaintiffs' Counsel Challenge Tests, 33 J. Voe. BEHAV. 
345 (1988). 
161. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). This issue is rarely 
addressed in the case law, probably because the validation process itself entails 
some showing of the necessity of the procedure to the decision-making. 
162. See Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 
630 F.2d 79, llO (2d Cir. 1980). 
163. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,661 (1989); Clady, 770 
F.2d at 1432. 
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1989). 
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ever, action by an employer to eliminate or correct past discriminatory 
practices is by no means limited to that effected through litigation. 
Rather, employers will often not only eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices, but will also take steps to affirmatively adjust for past discrim-
ination because of moral or societal obligation or to avoid the threat 
of future litigation. 16s 
A. Court-Ordered Relief in Contested Cases 
A general theory in fashioning relief is to attempt to return 
victims of discrimination to their "rightful place," i. e., the employ-
ment position they would have held but for the discriminatory acts.l66 
This remedy is restricted by the requirement that the interests of the 
other employees be considered. 167 In addition, the "rightful place" 
theory is generally limited to actual victims of discrimination. l68 
Beyond such "victim-specific" remedial action, courts may give 
relief to an identified class which has suffered the effects of discrim-
ination. One way in which courts will effect such class-wide remedies 
is through hiring or promotion "goals."169 For example, courts can 
require that for each white promoted, a black will also be promotedl70 
until a specified pe~centage is reached. 171 Courts may not trammel 
the interests of whites or other nonminorities, however, by displacing 
them from a currently held position, barring their promotion, or 
16~. J. FEILD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS: A FRESH LOOK AT THE RECORD TWENTY-TWO 
YEARS AFTER THE BEGINNING (1983); ORGANIZATION RESOURCES COUNSELLORS, 
CEO SURVEY ON NUMERICAL MEASURES (1984). 
166. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1976)~ 
(seniority); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 247-49" 
(5th Cir. 1974) (promotion procedures). 
167. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 374-76 
(1977). But see Franks, 424 U.S. at 774. 
168. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1984). 
169. In reality, these "goals" are quotas. However, courts often avoid the use of 
the term quotas, especially after the Supreme Court's condemnation of quotas 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For 
a discussion of Bakke, see infra text accompanying notes 259-268. 
170. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987); Crockett v. Green, 
534 F.2d 725, 717 (7th Cir. 1976); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 
(5th Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971) (en 
banc). 
171. The percentage is generally based on the percentage of the minority group in 
the general population, see Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-80; Crockett, 534 F.2d 
at 718, or to the percentage of minorities in some other relevant category, see, 
e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1526 (11th Cir. 1985) (promotional 
register); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,173 (3d Cir.) 
(craft areas), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The length of the application 
of class-wide remedies may be contingent upon the employer creating nondis-
criminatory procedures. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178. 
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depriving them of other vested rights, such as seniority.172 Of course, 
any minorities hired or promoted must be qualified. 173 
Occasionally courts have declined to implement mandatory hiring 
goals if less severe remedies will be equally effective. 174 In determining 
whether a less severe, more flexible approach will be equally effective, 
a court may examine the employer's history of discrimination and 
any existing efforts to eliminate discrimination. 17s 
Relief may· also include an award of back pay. In the context 
of Title VII cases, back pay is not necessarily a punitive measure, 176 
but is necessary to make a party whole. 177 Likewise, the award of 
attorney's fees may be allowed, often more as a necessity to encourage 
meritorious cases rather than as a punitive measure. 178 As with hiring 
quotas, courts may decline to award back pay after considering good 
faith on the part of the employer. 179 In addition to back pay for 
individual victims of discrimination, courts have also ordered class-
wide back pay, especially when it would be difficult to reconstruct 
individualized relief. 180 
172. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S; at 182 ("absolute bar" to promotion); Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281-84 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality 
opinion) (displacement from currently held position); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 
458 U.S. 219, 239-40 (1982) (seniority). 
173. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183. 
174. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (strictly 
defined hiring and promotional quotas can be set based upon specifications 
and reasonable timetables but developing impartial hiring and promotional 
goals may be a better remedy); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 
646-47 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979) (the court said the 
~ ordered injunction was the appropriate remedy, not a detailed quota system 
as ordered by the lower court). 
175. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
448-50 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1294 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). 
176. See Albemarle Paper CO. V. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975). Such an award 
may have the effect of coercing compliance. See id. at 417-18. 
177. See id. at 418. 
178. See id. at 415. 
179. Courts have declined to award back pay because of the unsettled nature of 
the law. See Kober V. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
1973); United States V. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378-80 (8th Cir. 1973). 
Additionally, if an employer offers a complainant a job or promotion at the 
pay rate which the complainant is seeking, but without offering retroactive 
seniority, this will toll the employer's future liability for back pay. Ford Motor 
CO. V. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 232-34 (1982). Such a policy promotes the goal 
of making curative job offers, id. at 228, speeds up resolution of the cases, 
id. at 228-29, and still allows a plaintiff to pursue a claim for retroactive 
seniority, id. at 233-34. 
180. See Segar V. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471. 
U.S. 1115 (1985); Pettway V. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 
256-57 (5th Cir. 1974). Segar noted that although class-wide back pay may 
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As with applicable standards in establishing cases based on 
constitutional rather than Title VII violations, lSI judicial remedies 
purporting to address equal protection violations are subject to a 
different standard of review from those remedies aimed at Title VII 
violations. ls2 In Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers,ls3 the Court noted 
the variety of equal protection standards to which it had alluded in 
the past, and concluded with a synthesis of prior statements. Justice 
Brennan, . announcing the Court's plurality opinion, found that the 
judicial relief, which established a percentage goal to remedy past' 
failures, was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental inter-
est. 184 
A second important distinction between constitutional claims and 
Title VII actions is the extent to which relief will be made retroactive; 
where Title VII remedies are concerned, courts are likely to limit the 
scope of the order to providing relief for those actions occurring 
after the effective date of Title VII's applicability. ISS Unlike consid-
erations of "intent," or even adverse impact in general,ls6 both of 
benefit a few nonvictims, "the employer, as a proven discriminator, must bear 
that risk." Segar, 738 F.2d at 1291. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. 
182. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 
U.S. 421, 479-81 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality) (noting that, although the 
Court had not decided on a standard, the relief in question was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and that this was the most 
rigorous test). In Sheet Metal Workers', Justice Brennan cited cases that 
highlighted the various approaches taken by the Court in selecting the proper 
standard to apply when analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious re-
medial measures: "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling governmental 
interest," Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (opinion 
of Powell, J .); id. at 284-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); "a most searching examination," Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); "necessary to the accomplish-
ment of [a substantial state] interest," Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); "substantially 
related to achievement of [important governmental] objectives," Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 359 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun, 
11.). 
A great number of statements regarding applicable standards can garner 
no more than plurality opinions. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 467 U.S. 977 (1988); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); 
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
183. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 
(1986). 
184. Id. at 480-81. 
185. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
186. See James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 356 (5th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
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which may utilize pre-Act statistics to infer discriminatory actions in 
the present, relief will not be extended to such pre-Act discrimination. 
When ordering relief, courts will often exercise continuing juris-
diction over the defendant's employment procedures to ensure com-
pliance with the court's order.l87 Additionally, courts may require 
pre-approval of a particular employment test or, in the course of a 
review of past practices, pre-approval of an examination that will 
subsequently replace them. 188 
B. Consent Decrees 
Consent decrees contain elements of a contractual agreement as 
well as a court order .I89 As with court-ordered remedies in contested 
cases, consent decrees may incorporate hiring goals or quotas. l90 The 
resulting relief then is not always limited to the actual victims of 
discrimination .191 
In approving a consent decree, a court usually will conduct a 
hearing to inquire into the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of 
the proposed agreement. 192 Absent fraud qr collusion, a court will 
often refuse to second guess the agreement of the parties because of 
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1977). A court may include a provision 
allowing plaintiff's· counsel to inspect employment records. See Russell v. 
American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 
U.S. 935 (1976). 
187. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 895 (1974). . 
188. See Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 731-33 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 
189. See Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983). A consent decree 
may be modified by the courts "should 'changed circumstances' subvert its 
intended purposes." [d. at 920. Courts may also order remedial actions when 
an employer violates a consent decree. See, e.g., Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 
822-23 (1Ith Cir. 1985) (pursuant to provision in decree that allowed special 
master to order relief for violations of the decree, special master ordered 
promotion and back pay). 
190. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. 501, 510 (1986) (specifying the number of minorities to be promoted); 
Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1986) ("double filling" 
every sixth vacancy with a white and a black candidate), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 
935 (1987). 
191. See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 516; Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1011 
n.1O (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989). In addition, consent 
decrees may serve as a basis for attempting resolution of other pending suits. 
See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F .2d 826, 836-37 (5th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). 
192. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1559 (5th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 921 (6th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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the preference for voluntary settlement of Title VII employment 
discrimination suits .193 
On appeal, the criteria for determining the validity of a consent 
decree are similar to standards of review of court-imposed remedial 
. action. Courts may consider the propriety of hiring or promotional 
goals in relation to the percentage of the minority community or 
labor pool,l94 whether the agreement trammels nonminority inter-
ests,195 the duration of the provisions,l96 whether the agreement 
remedies past discrimination,l97 and whether it benefits only qualified 
persons. 198 
While interested parties may intervene to be heard regarding 
their objections to a consent decree,l99 they are not entitled to 
intervention by right.2°° This is true even though the consent decree 
may affect preexisting contractual rights. 201 The consent of interested 
parties is not required because the consent decree does not enjoin 
them or require action by them.202 
193. See Williams v. City 0/ New Orleans, 729 F.2d at 1559; Williams v. Vukovich,' 
720 F.2d at 923; United States v. City 0/ Miami, 614 F.2d at 1331. Where the 
government is the plaintiff, the danger of an unfair agreement is lessened. [d. 
at 1332. Besides conserving judicial and executive resources, a voluntary agree-
ment increases the prospect of voluntary compliance. Id. at 1333. 
194. See Williams v. City 0/ New Orleans, 729 F.2d at 1562; Williams v. Vukovich, 
720 F.2d at 917; United States v. City 0/ Miami, 614 F.2d at 1339; ct. Howard, 
871 F.2d at 1003 n.5 (analyzing target positions to which blacks probably 
would have been promoted absent discrimination, and then making promotions 
to those positions alternating between blacks and whites); Kirkland v. New 
York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1129 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(comparing the percentage of minority promotions to the percentage of blacks 
on a ranked promotional list). 
195. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1984). 
Delay in promotion of nonrninorities is not a sufficient reason to invalidate a 
consent decree. See Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 364-65 (6th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935 (1987); Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1134-35. 
196. See Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1135-36; United States v. City 0/ Miami, 614 F.2d 
at 1340. 
197. See United States v. City 0/ Miami, 614 F.2d at 1339. 
198. See id. at 1340. 
199. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. 501, 506 (1986) (union); Stotts, 467 U.S. at 566 (union); Williams v. City 
of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1556 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (individuals); 
United States v. City 0/ Miami, 614 F.2d at 1326-27 (fraternal organization); 
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 839-40 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs in other suits who may be affected by the consent decree 
and who are displeased with the terms of the consent), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
944 (1976). 
200. See Allegheny-Ludlum, 517 F.2d at 843. 
201. See, e.g., EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 1977) (collective 
bargaining agreement). 
202. See Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529-30. 
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C. Voluntary Affirmative Action Programs 
Voluntary affirmative action programs reflect an employer's 
independent decision to implement procedures to remedy past dis-
crimination.203 Like judicial decrees, however, voluntary programs 
cannot unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminorities,204 al-
though they may call on nonminorities to share some of the burden 
of remedial action.20s 
Probably the best known. form of affirmative action is one 
involving hiring or promotion "goals" or "quotas." Such a plan 
was the subject of notoriety as a result of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.206 In 
Bakke, despite disagreement as to the basis for the conclusion, the 
Court struck down the use of bare quotas.207 
However, this is not to say that any quota plan must necessarily 
fail. At least initially, quota plans survived in the wake of the Bakke 
decision. 208 For example, in Smith v. HarveY,2W the St. Petersburg 
Fire Department required an extensive set of prerequisites before its 
"one-for-one"210 affirmative action promotional plan would take 
effect. First, there had to be a finding of underutilization of minor-
ities or females in both the relevant job and category. Second, the 
last promotion made had to be of a male or a white. Third, a 
qualified minority or female had to be available to fill the position. 
Fourth, there had to be no exceptions to justify a deviation.211 The 
court subjected the plan to strict scrutiny and found it constitutional 
in light of several factors. The plan was to continue only until a 
racial. and gender-based balance was achieved. Further, the court 
approved the plan because of its flexibility and its narrow remedial 
203. An employer is not required to wait for an employment procedure to be 
challenged before imposing remedial or "affirmative" action. See United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). 
204. See id. at 208. 
205. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986) (Powell, J., 
plurality). Generally, a denial of a future opportunity, as opposed to a 
deprivation of a present benefit or right, will be upheld. This is especially true 
where there is no complete bar to nonminority hiring. See id. at 282. 
206. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a brief review of Bakke, see infra text accompanying 
notes 259-268. 
207. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271 (Powell, J., plurality). 
208. Bakke did not eliminate quota systems altogether. Rather, it required as a 
prerequisite a judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of constitutional or 
statutory violations, with continuing oversight by the relevant governmental 
body. Id. at 307-08. Additionally, a nonquota system, where race is only a 
consideration, survives Bakke. Id. at 316-17. 
209. 648 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (mem.). 
210. That is, for each nonminority promoted, a minority would be promoted. Id. 
211. Id. at 1106. 
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purpose. The fact that it did not displace whites, preclude whites 
from being promoted, and was valid only after a showing of past 
discrimination were all important factors to the court. 212 
Related to hiring or promotional quotas are minority "set-aside" 
programs, which impose goals or quotas on governmental contract-
ing.213 While the specific terms and conditions of the programs vary, 
they all require that a givenpercentage214 of contracts awarded by a 
governmental entity be set aside for minority business enterprises. lIS 
As with other voluntary quota programs, minority set-aside programs 
must be narrowly tailored, must be premised on findings of past 
discrimination, and cannot trammel the interests of nonminorities. 216 
Such programs will be more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny if 
they are flexible, if they incorporate waiver provisions that do not 
lock a governmental entity into a contract that is financially uncom-
petitive,217 and as long as they do not put the entity in the position 
212. [d. at H08-15. In United Steelworkers oj America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979), the Supreme Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action program that 
included a 500/0 training quota. [d. at 198-200. The Court distinguished Weber 
from Bakke because Bakke involved the discrimination in federal assistance 
provisions of Title VI. [d. at 207 n.6. 
213. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (local 
government); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (federal government); 
Michigan Rd. Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd 
mem., 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (state government). 
214. The percentage share is usually in the range of five to thirty percent. See, e.g., 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54 (10%); Michigan Rd. Builders, 834 F.2d at 584 
(7% for minorities and 5% for females); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City 
of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1987) (30% for minorities and 
10% for females); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
215. A "Minority Business Enterprise" is generally defined as a business with at 
least 50% minority ownership or with at least 5 I % of the stock owned by 
minority group members. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454; Michigan Rd. Builders, 
834 F.2d at 585. 
216. See South Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. 
Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 851-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 871 (1984). 
217. See Keip, 713 F.2d at 174; Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.N.J. 
1970). A task force appointed by the Board of Estimates of the City of 
Baltimore to review the constitutionality of Baltimore's minority set-aside 
program noted the flexibility of set-aside plans. For example, if the bids are 
excessive, the Board of Estimates usually rejects the bids and requires that the 
contract be rebid. M. MILLE MANN & M. CWBUNDU, PUBLIC COMMENT DRAFT 
REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BALTI-
MORE CITY MBE AND WBE PROORAM 29 (1989). The report noted that in 
practice, the majority of the value of the city's contracts was not subject to 
the set-aside provisions, whether because of exception, waiver, or other ex-
emption. [d. at 29-31. Baltimore's set-aside program is codified at BALTIMORE 
CITY, MD., CODE art. I, §§ 217-19 (Supp. 1989). 
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of entering into contracts which in some way conflict with other. 
legislation.218 
One final approach used to validate voluntary affirmative action 
programs is known as standardization. This approach seeks to elim-
inate differences in performance appraisals that exist between groupS.219 
A helpful explanation appears in a brief filed on behalf of the City 
of Chicago in United States v. City of Chicago:220 
[I]f a college entrance examination were given to two groups 
of candidates on two separate dates, different forms of the 
test (i.e., different sets of test questions) might be given to 
avoid unfair advantage to the second group of candidates 
... [L]et us say that the mean score for candidates taking 
Form A of the test was 80, and that the standard deviation 
was 5. This would mean that 68% of [the] candidates scored 
between 75 and 85 (the mean score of 80, plus or minus 
the standard deviation of 5), that 95070 of [the] candidates 
scored between 70 and 90 (plus or minus two times the 
standard deviation), and that 99% of [the] c;andidates scored 
between 65 and 95 (plus or minus three standard deviations). 
On Form B, let us suppose, the mean score was 75 and 
the standard deviation was 7. This would mean that 68% 
of the candidates scored between 68 and 82, that 95% scored 
between 61 and 89, and that 99% scored between 54 and 
96 .... 
. . . [O]ne must either assume that one group of candi-
dates was substantially worse than the other group, or that 
Form A of the test was easier than Form B. Absent any 
evidence supporting the former assumption, one must make 
the hitter assumption and conclude that, despite efforts to 
make the two tests the same, Form A was actually an easier 
test. Under these circumstances, a score of 85 on Form A 
is not the same as a score of 85 on Form B. Thus, to make 
218. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 925-28 (municipal ordinance 
invalid because it violated city charter). 
219. See United States v. City of Chicago, 752 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. III. 1990). 
Standardization may be made race neutral by standardizing scores according 
to the evaluator or may be race conscious by standardizing the scores according 
to race. See Supplemental Brief for the City of Chicago in Support of Its 
Motion for Modification of the Injunctive Order Regarding Sergeant Promo-
tions at 10-11, 13-15 (filed June 22, 1988, in United States v. City of Chicago, 
No. 73 C 2080 (N.D. III.» [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for the City of 
Chicago]. Standardization can also be accomplished by standardizing according 
to test form. [d. at 5-9. 
220. Supplemental Brief for the City of Chicago, supra note 219. 
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fair comparisons among candidates from both groups, stan-
dardization of scores is necessary. 221 
341 
While the example given uses comparisons between a homoge-
neous group of test takers on two different tests, in the context of 
affirmative action related to employment tests the differences de-
scribed would be between two racial groups taking the same test. In 
other words, what might be observed is that white candidates had a 
mean score of eighty with a standard deviation of five, while black 
candidates taking the same test had a mean score of seventy-five 
with a standard deviation of seven. The City's brief continued its 
explanation of standardization as follows: 
The process of standardizing scores is a two step process. 
First, scores are converted to what statisticians call "Z-
scores" or "standard scores." A Z score gives a candidate's 
relative standing within his or her own group. The formula 
for computing a Z score is: 
Raw Score minus Mean 
Z Score = 
Standard Deviation 
The second step of the process involves converting Z 
scores to more recognizable standard scores, using the same 
mean and the standard deviation for both groups of can-
didates. The formula for doing so is: 
Standardized score = (Z Score x Standard Deviation) 
+ Mean.222 
Because the Z scores are given the same mean and standard deviation, 
the differences that exist between racial groups are eliminated.223 
221. Id. at 5-7. 
222. Id. at 7-8. 
223. For example, if the scores are standardized to a mean of 75 and a standard 
deviation of 10, the results will be as follows: for the Z score of 1, the formula 
will be 1 times 10, plus 75 for a standardized score of 85; and for the Z score 
of 1.4, the formula will be 1.4 times 10, plus 75, for a standardized score of 
89. Therefore, after standardization, the black candidates' ranks will be higher 
than the white candidates'. 
The standardization plan promulgated by the City of Chicago resulted in 
the following mix of candidates in the top 500, the number of expected 
promotions to be made from the sergeants list: 332 whites (66.4%), 138 blacks 
(27.6070), 30 hispanics (6%); 442 males (84.4%) and 78 females (15.6%). 
Supplemental Brief for the City of Chicago, supra note 219, at 24. Although 
the plan was aimed at hispanics and females, blacks still did better than before 
standardization. [d. Noting that "[s]tandardization is a statistical methodology 
that permits a more meaningful comparison -of the relative performance scores 
of candidates drawn from two or more groups," the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois upheld the plan. United States v. City of Chicago, 
No. 73 C 2080, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1988) (mem. order). 
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A second but related method of standardization is "within group 
scoring," which equalizes scores based on their percentile ranking 
within a particular group.224 In this method, the raw scores are 
converted into group-based percentile ranks which reflect. an appli-
cant's standing with reference to his or her own racial group. This 
method effectively erases average group differences in test scores.225 
Applicants are then referred to the hiring or promotional authority 
ranked according to their percentile comparisons, rather than their 
raw scores. 226 
In Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission,227 the 
Civil Service Commission observed test results that failed the "four-
fifths rule."228 As a result, it converted the scores of both minorities 
and nonminorities by equating or "normalizing" them, thereby in-
creasing the minority pass rate to fifty percent without removing any 
of the nonminorities from the eligibility list. 229 In Bratton v. City of 
Detroit,230 the Sixth Circuit reviewed a voluntary affirmative action 
program. A hybrid standardization procedure was used in Bratton 
where two lists were created but were not adjusted to reflect frequency 
distributions based on differences in performance among racial 
224. See generally Delahunty, Perspectives on Within-Group Scoring, 33 1. Voc. 
BEHAV. 463 (1988). . 
225. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING: VALIDITY 
GENERALIZATION, MINORITY ISSUES AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY 
86 (1989). . 
226. [d. at 251. The effects of within group scoring can be seen in the following 
example. On a test with a perfect score of 100, 3 white candidates (A, B, and 
C) and 3 black candidates (X, Y, and Z) receive the following raw scores: 




If the highest score in each group is 100070 then the following chart indicates 
the percentile rankings of each candidate within the group: 
white candidates black candidates 
A - 97 = 100% X - 88 = 100% 
B - 94 = 96.9% (94/.97) Y - 87 = 98.9% (87/.88) 
C - 89 = 91.7% (89/.97) Z - 84 = 95.4% (84/.88) 
Using the raw scores, the rank order is A, B, C, X, Y, Z. If four promotions 
are made, then the promotion rate for whites will be 100%, and the promotion 
rate for blacks will be 33.3%. Therefore, the results will yield an adverse 
impact under the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines "four-fifths rule" because 33.3 
is less than four-fifths of 100. However, if the rank order is determined by the 
percentage amount assigned to each candidate, the result is: A, X, Y, B, Z, 
C. Now, two whites and two blacks are promoted, the promotion rate for each 
group is 66.7%, and the "four-fifths rule" is satisfied. 
227. 733 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469-U.8. 1117 (1985). 
228. [d. at 222-23. 
229. [d. 
230. 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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groups.231 Instead, promotions were made alternately off of each list 
in order to achieve a fifty-fifty ratio.232 The fifty-fifty ratio was 
based on the . general population.233 Perhaps the simplest post-test 
type of standardization was used in Kirkland v. New York State 
. Department of Correctional Services,234 where the average point dis-
parity between races was calculated. then that number was added to 
the score of each minority. 235 
IV. ALLEGATIONS OF .REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
A. Challenges Prior to the 1988 Term 
Prior to Martin v. Wilks,236 claims of reverse discrimination237 
certainly were not unknown. Such attacks generally fell into one of 
two categories. The first category consisted of nonminority interven-
ors challenging a court order, whether issued pursuant to a contested 
case or a consent decree. The second category was comprised of 
individuals challenging provisions of some affirmative action pro-
gram.238 Whatever the nature of the challenge, reverse discrimination 
cases have as an underlying theme a party who feels that his or her 
rights or opportunities are adversely affected by some action aimed 
at benefiting a minority or group of minorities.239 
231. [d. at 882. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. at 893. 
234. 628 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981). 
235. [d. at 797-98. This approach could result in several statistical problems. For 
instance, blacks could achieve a score greater than the test's maximum. Also, 
a disproportionate number of minorities could be moved into the promotable 
ranges with the possible result of trammeling the interests of nonminorities. 
236. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
237. "Reverse discrimination" is a convenient shorthand for referring to cases in 
which a member of a nonminority class, usually a male and almost always a 
white, claims discrimination based on race and/or sex. In fact, it is no different 
from any other form of discrimination. The Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the same standards apply to alleged discrimination against nonminorities 
as minorities. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-72, 
81 (1977). 
238. This category could conceivably overlap with situations in which the program 
resulted from an employer's attempts to comply with a court order. The most 
significant of such cases is Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). See generally 
infra text accompanying notes 297-307. 
239. Ryanen, Commentary of a Minor Bureaucrat, 33 J. Voc. BEHAV. 379, 382-86 
(1988) (postulating that there has been a change in the Civil Rights Act from 
protecting the right of individuals to be free from discrimination to preferential 
treatment of racial, ethnic, or gender groups). 
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1. Challenges to Consent Decrees By or On Behalf of 
Nonminorities 
[Vol. 20 
Consent decrees are often subject to challenge by nonminorities 
who feel adversely affected by the terms of the decree or by unions 
or fraternal organizations on behalf of nonminorities. 24O When a 
consent decree is challenged, the intervenors have the burden to show 
"unusual adverse impact" at the fairness hearing. 241 As a practical 
matter, this may be a difficult burden to meet in light of the fact 
that a consent decree often provides relief which would not have 
been available to the parties had they proceeded to trial. 242 Of course, 
to the extent that an agreement which is not legally defensible affects 
the rights of third parties, it may be struck down or modified.243 
Although a challenger seeking to set aside a consent decree bears 
a heavy burden, such hearings may be more intense than in other 
types of cases in which a consent order is challenged because the 
decree may have a significant effect on third parties. 244 Review may 
be even more exacting when private litigants are involved, as opposed 
to a suit by a governmental entity, because financial considerations 
may affect private plaintiffs' decision to settle.245 
When determining whether to 'enforce a consent decree against 
a challenge, the court is limited to the "four' corners" of the 
agreement. The court may not speculate as to what the parties would 
have intended regarding missing provisions.246 This is not to say that 
courts may not modify consent decrees if the original provisions are 
inequitable or unfair247 or because of changed circumstances.248 
240. See supra note 199. These third parties are not necessarily nonminorities. See, 
e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1556 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) (females and hispanics). 
241. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 n.41 (1976). Trial 
courts are apparently given fairly broad latitude in dealing with reverse dis-
crimination claims because the standard of appellate review is abuse of discre-
tion. See Williams v. City 0/ New Orleans, 729 F.2d at 1558-59. 
242. See Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985), a/I'd sub nom. 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
611 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). 
243. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 926 (1983) (striking down a 
consent decree that precluded future challenges if the black pass rate on an 
unvaIidated examination was 55070 of the white pass rate). 
244. See, e.g., Williams v. City 0/ New Orleans, 729 F.2d at 1560-61 ("searching 
examination") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980»; 
United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 nn. 10, 11 & 12 (5th Cir. 
1981) (en banc) (per curiam) (analogizing review to that involved in class 
actions, stockholders' derivative suits, and bankruptcy proceedings). 
245. See id. at 1590. 
246. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574-76 (1984). 
247. See, e.g., McAleer v. AT&T, 416 F. Supp. 435, 439-40 (D.D.C. 1976) (modi-
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2. Challenges to Voluntary Affirmative Action Programs 
Any analysis of judicial review of voluntary affirmative action 
programs should begin with Fullilove v. Klutznick. 249 This is not 
because of the particular program involved, but because Fullilove 
represents somewhat of an exception to the general rules governing 
judicial review of affirmative· action programs. In Fullilove, the 
Supreme Court reviewed a claim of reverse discrimination based on 
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 which provides minority 
set-asides for public works projects.250 
After engaging in an extensive review of the provision's legislative 
history,2S1 the Court made a particular point that it has to defer to 
Congress when examining the constitutionality of legislation by Con-
gress, because Congress is a "co-equal branch charged by the Con-
stitution with the power to 'provide for the . . . general Welfare of 
the United States."'252 Distinguishing the case from one in which the 
Court was asked to review a decision of a single judge or govern-
mental entity,2S3 the Court discussed the unique position of Congress 
caused by its spending power, the Commerce Clause, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, and its power to enforce the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.254 With this backdrop, the 
Court examined the means chosen by Congress to achieve goals 
which were within its unique purview. The Court stated that "[iJn 
no matter should we pay more deference to the opinion of Congress 
than in its choice of instrumentalities to perform a function that is 
within its power. "255 After reviewing numerous aspects of the legis-
lation,2S6 the Court held that the provision would withstand whichever 
fying consent decree so that males denied promotions in favor of females were 
awarded monetary damages). 
248. See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway. Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (1Oth Cir. 1979) 
(quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932» (noting that 
the change must result in a "'hardship so extreme and unexpected' as to make 
the decree oppressive"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). 
249. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
250. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988). This section provides standard set-aside provisions 
including a requirement that 10070 of the amount of each grant be expended 
for minority business enterprises, which are defined as privately owned busi-
nesses with at least 50% ownership or at least 51 % stock ownership of publicly 
owned businesses by citizens who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, 
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts. [d. 
251. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 456-73. 
252. [d. at 472 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 1). 
253. [d. at 473. 
254. [d. at 473-77. 
255. [d. at 480 (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 
U.S. 582, 603 (1949». 
256. The Court held that consideration of race was permissible, 448 U.S. at 482-
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of the Bakke standards chosen to guide a reviewing court. 257 
Thus, even a cursory reading of Fullilove will reveal the unique 
position of Congress to enact remedial legislation, and its importance 
to the Court's conclusion. However, one need not guess at the special 
nature of the Fullilove reasoning because, after Fullilove, certain 
Justices explicitly pointed out the uniqueness of the ruling. The 
decision in Fullilove does not apply to affirmative action which was 
not created by Congressional enactment. 258 
The Bakke decision proscribed the use of straight quotas as a 
criterion of affIrmative action programs that were not specifically remedial 
in nature. Bakke involved a challenge to the University of California at 
Davis medical school policy of creating a special admissions program, 
which reserved a predetermined number of places for minorities.259 Given 
the confusing array of pluralities and crisscrossing standards,26O 
it is not surprising that Bakke has created- more confusion than 
resolution.261 
84; that "a sharing of the burden" by nonminority businesses which lost 
opportunities is not impermissible, ide at 484-85; that the legislation's "under-
inclusiveness" (i.e., its failure to include all disadvantaged groups) did not 
render it improper, id. at 485-86; and that the legislation's "overinclusiveness" 
(i.e., its bestowing of benefits on businesses which may not have previously 
suffered from discriminatory actions) was not fatal, especially in light of the 
legislation's waiver and exemption provisions, id. at 486-89. 
257. [d. at 492. 
258. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., plurality) ("our treatment of an exercise of congressional power 
in Fullilove cannot be dispositive" when addressing a state or local plan). 
Whether the standard of review is the same for private employers is somewhat 
unclear. See Bushey v. New York State Civil Servo Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 
227 n.8 (2d Cir. 1984), cert_ denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (indicating they were 
not the same); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-01 
(1979) (implying a distinction when it stressed that the case did not allege a 
constitutional violation or state action, but only a Title VII violation). 
259. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1978). 
260. Justice Powell filed the plurality opinion. [d. at 269. Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in 
part. [d. at 324. Justice White filed a separate opinion, id. at 379, as did 
Justices Marshall, id. at 387, and Blackmun, id. at 402. Justice Stevens, who 
concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, filed an opinion in 
which the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist joined. [d. at 
408. 
261. See, e.g., South Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Metro-
politan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 850 (lith Cir.) ("[n)o clear consensus 
emerged from the court's decision"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Bratton 
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 1983) ("there appears to be no 
agreement on the nature of the governmental interest which must be at stake 
. . . nor on the standard under which the method employed to achieve that 
interest is to be reviewed"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); United States 
v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We frankly admit 
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A number of concepts now familiar in analyzing discrimination 
cases, however, did emerge from Bakke. First, remedial action must 
be based on some finding, whether judicial, administrative or legis-
lative, of a constitutional or statutory violation against the group in 
question.262 Societal discrimination alone will not justify remedial 
actions.263 Second, and most germane to this' section, the Court upheld 
the consideration of race as a factor,264 but rejected quotas per se.26S 
Consistent. with Bakke, when courts review voluntary plans which 
avoid specific racial goals or quotas, but instead are more flexible 
and are only conscious of race, the requirement of a finding of past 
discrimination appears to be eased.266 This is not to say that racial 
distinctions may be used overtly for what is perceived to be "benign" 
societal purposes.261 Likewise, a plan that may pass constitutional or 
Title VII scrutiny on its face may be invalidated if it is applied in a 
discriminatory manner. 268 
Just as hiring or contracting provisions that create minority 
preferences without a specific finding of discrimination may be held 
unconstitutional, so too will affirmative action programs that artifi-
cially attempt to prevent otherwise legal layoffs of minorities. In 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,269 the Supreme Court ex-
amined layoff provisions that generally favored school teachers with 
the most seniority but incorporated an exception that precluded "a 
greater percentage of minority personnel [from being] laid off than 
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time 
that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In 
over one hundred and fifty pages of U.S. Reports, the Justices have told us 
mainly that they have agreed to disagree. "). 
262. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08 (Powell, J., plurality). 
263. [d. at 310 (Powell, J., plurality). 
264. [d. at 316-18 (Powell, J., plurality). 
265. [d. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality). 
266. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). A showing of 
conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories may suffice to 
justify consideration of one's minority status. [d. at 630. This imbalance need 
not necessarily rise to the level required to establish a prima facie adverse 
impact case. [d. at 652. Johnson may be distinguishable because it involved a 
gender-based decision, which is generally subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny 
than a race-conscious choice. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
243-46 (1989). However, Johnson did refer to Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), 
which involved minority quotas. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630. 
267. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) 
(rejecting a policy of dismissing whites for stealing but not blacks). 
268. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Beckley, 797 F .2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that adoption of a formal plan did not save the informal decision based on 
improper racial factors). As a practical matter, such situations will primarily 
address individualized decisions, although a series of "informal" decisions may 
give rise to a pattern· or practice claim. 
269. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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of the layoff. "270 As a result of the provision, when layoffs became 
necessary in 1974, a tenured nonminority was laid off, while a 
probationary black teacher was not. 271 
While agreeing that the provision was unconstitutional, the Court 
was unable to garner a majority to agree on the particularized analysis 
to be applied. Justice Powell's plurality opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, applied a heightened level of 
scrutiny to the provision. This heightened level of scrutiny required 
the remedy to be narrowly tailored to the purpose to be accom-
plished.272 The Powell plurality included language requiring a showing 
of prior discrimination by the relevant governmental entity in order 
to justify an affirmative action program.273 Justice O'Connor agreed 
that the program was not sufficiently narrowly tailored,274 but she 
rejected a necessity of contemporaneous findings of discrimination. 275 
Justice White concurred in the result, apparently focusing on the fact 
that the plan discharged whites who would otherwise be retained in 
order to make room for blacks, none of whom had been shown to 
be victims of discrimination. 276 Aside from stating that this was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, he offered little more insight 
into his reasoning. 
270. [d. at 270. 
271. The Board of Education originally ignored the prOVISion, laying off the 
p'robationary employee instead. [d. at 271. A federal court suit by two laid-
off employees was dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction because there was 
no showing of pre-1972 discrimination to justify a constitutional claim and 
they failed to file EEOC claims as required by Title VII. [d. In a subsequent 
state court action, the Jackson City Circuit Court upheld a breach of contract 
claim and required the Board to abide by the minority preference provision, 
finding it constitutionally permissible as a remedy for past societal discrimi-
nation. [d. at 272. 
272. [d. at 279-80. This increased level was especially necessary in view of the fact 
that whites were laid off, implying a lesser standard of scrutiny may be proper 
when non minorities suffer less harm. [d. at 281-82. The practical significance 
of this standard is that it requires an inquiry to determine whether a less 
restrictive means may achieve a similar remedial purpose. See id. at 280 n.6, 
283-84; see also id. at 273 (noting that the level of scrutiny is the same for 
classifications which discriminate against minorities or nonminorities). 
273. [d. at 274-75. But see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
198 n.1 (1979) (noting historical discrimination). Weber, however, involved 
private rather than governmental affirmative action. [d. at 200-01. 
274. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
275. [d. at 290-91. The distinction seems minor because Justice O'Connor noted 
the unanimity of the Court regarding the permissibility of a plan which was 
not limited to remedying specific instances of discrimination, id. at 287, and 
agreed that "societal discrimination" not traceable to a governmental entity's 
own actions was an insufficient basis for affirmative action, id. at 288. 
276. [d. at 295. 
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In a similar vein, affirmative action programs may be susceptible 
to attack if they require acceptance of unqualified minorities in favor 
of qualified nonminorities.277 These programs may still be valid, 
however, if they include minority training programs in an effort to 
achieve a balanced workforce.278 Likewise, creating separate institu-
tional settings in a effort to remedy past societal discrimination, or 
perceptions of inferiority, will generally be held unconstitutional.279 
Unless there is a showing that the class-based remedy directly benefits 
members of the class that is disproportionately burdened, the program 
or plan will not survive constitutional scrutiny by the courtS.280 
In the context of employment tests, voluntary programs may fail 
if they involve post-test manipulations of the scoring mechanism in 
an attempt to salvage a test with adverse impact. One of the strongest 
statements against such an approach was in Hammon v. Barry. 28 I 
Although the pre-employment test for fire fighters had an adverse 
impact,282 there was no showing that the tests were invalid.283 Not-
withstanding this fact, the Director of the Office of Human Rights 
required a hiring preference for minorities.284 Because blacks who 
passed the test were not represented on the rank ordered list in 
proportion to the percentage who took the test, the department did 
away with rank ordering28S and established hiring quotas. 286 In re-
jecting the provision, the circuit court noted that past discrimination' 
did not justify the procedure.287 The District of Columbia court 
specifically rejected the plan as not being narrowly tailored to cure 
the violation as required and thus rejected the attempt at a post-test 
"f~. "288 If the test was invalid, the remedy should have been to 
replace the test with anew, valid one, rather than continuing with 
a bad test remedied after the fact.289 
277. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18 
(1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). 
278. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199,209 (1979) 
(upholding a plan to include 500/0 minorities in training programs). 
279. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 727, 733 (1982) 
(lawsuit by males challenging a nursing college policy excluding males). 
280. Id. at 728. 
281. 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988). 
282. Id. at 416, 428. 
283. Id. at 430. 
284. Id. at 414. 
285. Id. at 417. 
286. Id. at 419 n.14. 
287. Id. at 423, 428 n.32 (rejecting discrimination in the 19505 as a consideration). 
288. Id. at 430. 
289. Id. The court also noted that the remedy did not consider alternatives, id. at 
429, and was not narrowly tailored, id. at 430. 
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Likewise, in San Francisco Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San 
Francisco,29IJ a three-part test involving multiple choice, written, and 
oral examinations was found to result in adverse impact. 291 When 
the multiple choice and written portions of the test were used as a 
pass/fail screening device, and the oral scores were used to rank the 
candidates, the adverse impact was eliminated.292 Although the EEOC 
Uniform Guidelines support the consideration of alternate methods 
of using a test procedure to reduce adverse impact, and although the 
parties agreed that the revised scoring procedure was as job-related 
as the initial method, the court nonetheless struck down the city's 
post hoc change of the scoring procedure. This decision was based 
primarily upon the finding that the reweighting trammelled the in-
terests of nonminorities.293 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that the process was result-oriented, with race and gender 
serving as the deciding factors. Therefore, the court found it appro-
priate to apply a heightened level of scrutiny. 294 In striking down the 
procedure, the court noted that not only was it insufficiently con-
toured to the desired goal,295 but that such post-test changes misled 
applicants because they would have prepared differently had they 
known the relative importance of the three segments.296 
The lesson of such cases is that post-examination shortcuts will 
not be upheld. Rather, a test must either be validated or a new test 
must be devised. While such post hoc fixes may be acceptable, and 
in fact necessary where temporary judicial remedies are involved, 
they will not be allowed as part of an ongoing means to adjust for 
a discriminatory test. 
B. Martin v. Wilks 
Unlike plaintiffs in prior reverse discrimination cases, the plain-
tiffs in Martin v. Wilks297 were neither party intervenors in a lawsuit 
nor individuals challenging a voluntary affirmative action program. 
Rather, the plaintiffs were white firefighters who alleged that they 
were discriminated against when they were denied promotions in 
favor of less qualified blacks pursuant to consent decrees entered 
290. 812 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 842 F.2d 1126, rev'd, 869 F.2d 1182 
(1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989). 
291. [d. at 1127. 
292. [d. 
293. [d. at 1130-31. 
294. [d. 
295. [d. at 1131-32. 
296. [d. at 1132. 
297. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
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into in a previous, unrelated proceeding. 298 The trial court rejected 
the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the city was required to comply 
with the consent decree.299 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case 
with directions that the consent decree be reexamined, suggesting that 
the operative law governing 'voluntary affirmative action programs 
be applied.3°O The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
Eleventh Circuit, acknowledging the maxim that persons not parties 
to a proceeding could not be bound by its outcome.301 Although the 
majority of the circuits had held that a plaintiff's failure to intervene, 
when he knew or should have known that the litigation may affect 
his rights, would bar a subsequent "collateral attack," the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected this position.302 
The Court noted that persons whose rights might be affected 
should be joined as parties by the original litigants and that persons 
not joined should not be penalized because the original litigants failed 
to join them.303 Many possible future plaintiffs could be difficult, 
however, if not impossible, to identify because they might not even 
be employees at the time of the original action. The Supreme Court 
recognized this weakness but rejected it as a basis for disallowing 
subsequent challenges. 304 Furthermore, the Court was unpersuaded 
that the prospect of future litigation posed a significant concern . 
because the "breadth of a lawsuit and concomitant relief may be at 
least partially shaped in advance through Rule 19 to avoid needless 
clashes with future litigation. "30S 
298. [d. at 760. Prior to the entry of the consent decree, the court held hearings 
and published notices in local newspapers. [d. at 759. The firefighters associ-
ation objected, and seven firefighters who were not parties in Martin sought 
intervention. The district court denied their request, and the denial was sub-
sequently affirmed. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (lIth 
Cir. 1983). 
299. Martin, 490 U.S. at 759. 
300. [d. at 761. 
301. [d. 
302. [d. at 762-63. In the previous term, the Court upheld the Second Circuit's 
refusal to allow a collateral attack by non-parties against a consent decree 
regarding discriminatory employment tests. Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d 
Cir. 1986), a/I'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam). 
Although Martin apparently overrules Marino, it only makes a passing reference 
to Marino. Martin, 490 U.S. at 762-63 n.3. 
303. Martin, 490 U.S. at 762-67. 
304. [d. 
305. [d. at 768. This assumes that disgruntled plaintiffs will see the wisdom of a 
court order and refrain from filing suit. It also does not account for the less 
thoroughly considered result which sometimes is found in consent decrees. See 
generally Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) 
(consent decree that did not address layoffs could not later be modified by the 
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Standing alone, Martin v. Wilks is a significant case because it 
makes clear that judicial action, whether pursuant to a contested 
case or limited to affirmance of a consent decree,306 will forever be 
subject to later attack by nonparties. 307 As discussed in the two 
sections which follow, however, two opinions handed down by the 
Supreme Court earlier during the same term imply an even greater 
role for Martin in the realm of reverse discrimination claims. 
C. City oj Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 
In City oj Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,308 the Supreme Court 
noted probable jurisdiction in light of the Court's decision in Wygant 
v. Jackson Board oj Education3(1) to consider the striking down of 
Richmond's affirmative action program regarding minority contrac-
tors. 3lO Specifically, the Court reviewed the city's ordinance311 requir-
ing prime contractors performing work under city construction 
contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract's dollar 
court to abolish the standard seniority system). FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) provides: 
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 
person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order 
that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, 
or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and the joinder of that party would render the venue 
of the action improper, the party shall be dismissed from the action. 
306. While the challenged employment action in Martin was based on a prior 
consent decree, Martin, 490 U.S. at 759, the Court clearly included prior action 
pursuant to a contested case in the scope of its analysis, id. at 766-68. 
307. The Court did not address the prospect of successive waves of attack by new 
litigants based on theories that had already failed. The dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined, 
did allude to such a prospect, as well as the risk of inconsistent results. [d. at 
783-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although repetitive lawsuits would probably 
become frivolous in time, the prospect of inconsistent rulings could exacerbate, 
or at least do nothing to retard, a string of future lawsuits. 
308. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
309. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
310. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477. 
311. RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-156(a) (1985). 
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amount to "Minority Business Enterprises. "312 The plan declared that 
it was remedial in nature, and it expired after approximately five 
years. 313 As in Fullilove v. Klutznick,314 the Richmond plan authorized 
waivers in appropriate circumstances.3ls Although a denied contractor 
could protest under the Richmond procurement policies, the Court 
found that there was no direct administrative appeal from a decision 
regarding whether to grant a waiver. 316 
The backdrop of the plan included a study which indicated that, 
while 50070 of Richmond's population was black, only 0.67% of the 
city's prime construction contracts had been awarded to minority 
businesses from 1978 to 1983.317 Additionally, a variety of contrac-
tors' associations had no minority businesses in their membership.318 
However, at the public hearing on the plan, no evidence of direct 
discrimination was presented. Witnesses also testified that minority 
contractors were not available. 319 Testimony indicated that only 4.7% 
of the construction firms in the United States were minority owned 
and that 41 % of those were in California, New York, Illinois, 
Florida, and Hawaii.320 Additionally, testimony indicated that rep-
resentative,s of local contractors' organizations were actively seeking 
minority contractors. 321 
In response to an invitation to bid on a city project, the 
respondent, J.A. Croson Co., sought bids from subcontractors to 
perform plumbing work.322 After several unsuccessful attempts, Cro-
son received an expression of interest from only one minority sub-
contractor. When the subcontractor was unable to obtain financing 
and did not submit a bid, Croson requested a waiver of the thirty 
percent set-aside.323 Upon learning of the waiver request, the subcon-
tractor submitted a bid to Croson that increased the total bid price 
by seven percent.324 The waiver request was denied, and the city 
decided to rebid the project. 32S Thereafter, Croson sued under 42 
312. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477. A "Minority Business Enterprise" must be at least 
fifty-one percent owned and controlled by minority group members. [d. at 478 
(quoting RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12·23 (1985». 
313. [d. at 478 (citing RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-158(a) (1985». 
314. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
315. Croson, 488 U.S. at 478 (quoting RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-157 (1985». 
316. [d. at 479 (citing RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-126(a) (1985». 
317. [d. at 479-80~ 
318. [d. at 480. 
319. [d. 
320. [d. at 481. 
321. [d. 
322. [d. at 481-82. 
323. [d. at 482. 
324. [d. at 482-83. 
325. [d. at 483. 
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U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the Richmond ordinance was unconsti-
tutional on its face and as applied.326 Both the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit upheld the statute, 
according deference to the city's legislative decisions, consistent with 
the deference accorded to Congress by the Supreme Court in Fullilove 
v. Klutznick. 327 The decisions were based upon the findings that the 
ordinance was reasonable in light of past discrimination. 328 In light 
of Wygant v. Jackson,329 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded 
for further consideration. 330 
On remand, the Fourth Circuit found the plan unconstitutional 
on two counts. First, the plan was premised on findings of broad, 
societal discrimination, rather than discrimination within the city of 
Richmond.331 Second, even if a compelling interest existed in the 
form of prior discrimination,332 the thirty percent quota was not 
narrowly tailored. 333 
In affirming, a plurality of the Court distinguished its decision 
in Fullilove v. Klutznick. The plurality noted that Fullilove, which 
did not rely on strict scrutiny, involved congressional action.334 The 
plurality stated that the Fourteenth Amendment enlarged congres-
sional power but restricted the power of the states. 33S Therefore, 
while Congress has a positive grant of power to effect general 
remedial action,336 states or localities· are required to premise remedial 
326. [d. 
327. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
328. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-84. 
329. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality). Wygant rejected societal discrimi-
nation as a basis for voluntary affirmative action by a governmental entity. 
[d. at 274-75 (Powell, J., plurality). 
330. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (citing J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 
U.S. 1016 (1986) (mem.». 
331. [d. (quoting J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 
1987) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (Powell, J., plurality»). 
332. For cases indicating that past discrimination creates a compelling or strong 
governmental interest, see, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 204-05, 208 (1979) (private affirmative action); Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(government action falling more heavily on a single group); Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1973) (long history of 
discrimination). 
333. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486. 
334. [d. at 486-87 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
335. [d. at 490 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
336. While not specifically mentioning judicial remedies, the nature of the Court's 
analysis certainly could preclude judicial remedies not premised on specific 
findings, and should, by its import, apply similarly to consent decrees entered 
into by private parties and approved by the courts. [d. 
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action on a finding of prior discrimination in the area to which the 
remedy is applied. 337 
Against this backdrop, the plurality reaffirmed prior decisions 
applying the same standard of review to all racial classifications, 
whether they harmed or benefited any particular minority group.338 
The Court then searched for findings of discrimination in Richmond 
that would justify its set-aside program. A majority of the Court 
held that past discrimination in the construction industry was too 
generaP39 and that there was "nothing approaching a prima facie 
case of a constitutional or statutory violation by 'anyone' in the 
Richmond construction industry.' '340 
Significantly, the majority stated that the use of statistical dis-
parities, which existed in this case, has little probative value when 
special qualifications are needed to fill particular jobs. 341 While this 
proposition had some prior support in Mayor of Philadelphia v. 
Educational Equality League,342 and was the central focus of Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,343 it was somewhat of a departure from 
the analysis of Griggs v. Duke Power CO.344 and its progeny, espe-
cially where discrimination in hiring was involved. These cases reg-
ularly compared the percentage of minorities in a relevant hiring area 
with the percentage of minorities hired.34s Demonstrating plaintiffs' 
qualifications was not necessary to establish a prima facie case, rather 
it was incumbent on the employer to show its practices discriminated 
based on qualifications.346 Only in cases of adverse treatment, where 
intentional discrimination was alleged, were plaintiffs required to 
show as part of their initial burden that they were qualified.347 
337. [d. at 491-92 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Such prior discrimination could include 
situations where the government was a "passive participant" in local industry 
discrimination. [d. Similar prerequisites have been noted in school desegregation 
cases. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 414, 417 
(1977) (rejecting "cumulative violations" as a basis for justifying systemwide 
restructuring); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (requiring a 
specific showing of interdistrict segregation before setting aside district bound-
aries). 
338. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
339. [d. at 498-99. 
340. [d. at 500 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-75 
(1986». 
341. [d. at 501-02. 
342. 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974). 
343. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
344. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
345. See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text. 
346. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668-69 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, 
the majority in Wards Cove indicated that the employer need only come 
forward with an explanation of the relevancy of ·its qualifications. [d. at 659. 
347. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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Whether a more explicit revision of the Griggs standard will occur 
remains to be seen. In any event, the Croson majority rejected the 
assumption that the scarcity of minority contractors was due to any 
specific or generalized discriminatory practices. 348 In particular, the 
majority speculated that blacks simply may be drawn to occupations 
other than construction.349 Additionally, the plurality noted that 
without a showing of a discriminatory cause of the low minority 
involvement in the construction industry, the government could not 
justify its treatment of its citizens on a racial basis.350 
The majority further analyzed the means chosen by the city of 
Richmond to relieve presumed inequality3S1 by noting that it had 
failed to consider alternatives more directly related to the causes of 
lack of minority participation, such as the lack of capital. 352 The 
Court also rejected the thirty-percent quota because such a quota 
presumed the existence of sufficient minority business enterprises to 
meet the requirement. 353 
D. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 
When the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio,354 the reaction of the legal community was 
immediate. 3SS Wards Cove had the effect of creating a new burden 
348. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 502-03 (1989). 
349. [d. at 503. 
350. [d. at 510-11 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Again, this conclusion seems to redefine 
the Griggs conclusion that adverse impact does not require a showing of actual 
discriminatory acts and that the statistical situation alone establishes a prima 
facie case. 
351. Since the Court's ultimate holding is based on its rejection of the "objective" 
prong of the analysis, the discussion of the "means" prong appears to be 
dicta, or as the Court characterized its discussion, "observations." See id. at 
507. 
352. [d. 
353. [d. at 507-08. Implicit in this holding is the prospect that a nonquota program 
that considers race as a factor might pass constitutional muster. However, such 
a conclusion would necessitate a revision of the analysis regarding the use of 
statistical comparisons, which was not supported by a majority in Croson. This 
conclusion was suggested by the plurality of the Court which recognized the 
prospect of race-neutral devices even absent evidence of discrimination. Id. at 
509-10. 
354. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
355. Much of the reaction was unfavorable. See, e.g., NAT'L L.J., June 26, 1989, 
at 1 ("very clear, unmistakable signal of hostility to civil rights"); WASH. POST, 
June 14, 1989, § 1, at A4 ("extremely damaging"); L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1989, 
at A2, col. 2 ("blow to minorities"). From an employer's point of view, 
however, the decision was welcomed. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1989, at 
B7, col. 3; WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1989, at F3; L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1989, § 
2, at 6, col. 4. 
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on the plaintiff alleging adverse impact, requiring a more specific 
showing of cause and effect between a particular employment practice 
and resulting discrimination. 
In Wards Cove, Filipino and Alaska native cannery workers 
brought a Title VII suit for discrimination. The plaintiffs alleged 
that the Wards Cove Packing Company's hiring and promoting 
practices denied them more desirable jobs as noncannery workers. 356 
The claims were advanced under both adverse treatment and adverse 
impact theories. 3S7 
The "cannery jobs" were unskilled positions which were filled 
primarily by Filipinos and Alaska natives.3S8 In contrast, the "non-
cannery jobs," which were "skilled positions," paid more than 
cannery positions, and were filled primarily by whites. 359 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington rejected both the adverse treatment and adverse impact 
claims.360 The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the decision,361 but 
subsequently withdrew its opinion to review the case en banc.362 In 
its en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit recognized the conflict between 
the federal circuits regarding the propriety of applying adverse impact 
analysis to subjective hiring decisions like those at issue in Wards 
Cove. 363 The Ninth Circuit returned the case to the paneP64 for 
reconsideration in light of its decision that adverse impact analysis 
could be applied to subjective employment practices if a causal 
connection were shown between the practice and the impact.365 The 
panel then found that, by using the en banc opinion's standard, the 
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case under an adverse impact 
356. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 646-48. These practices included nepotism, a rehire 
preference, lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, an English 
language requirement, and a practice of not promoting from within. [d. at 
647. 
357. [d. at 648. 
358. [d. at 647. 
359. [d. 
360. [d. at 648. 
361. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). 
362. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985). 
363. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 n.l (9th Cir. 1987) 
(en banc). This decision predated Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977 (1988). In Wards Cove, hiring officials exercised their subjective 
judgment in determining whom to hire because no specific tests or objective 
criteria existed. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1479. 
364. Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1480. 
365. [d. at 1482. Under the standard set forth in the court's en banc decision, a 
plaintiff would be required to show a significant adverse impact upon a 
protected class, to identify the specific employment practices responsible, and 
to show a causal relationship between the identified practice and the adverse 
impact. [d. 
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theory.366 The case was .then remanded for consideration of any 
business necessity defense.367 Noting that the case raised questions on 
which the Supreme Court had been evenly divided in Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust,368 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.369 
A review of Watson is warranted to understand the significance 
of Wards Cove. In Watson, a black bank employee complained that 
her superior's decision on four separate occasions to promote a white 
instead of her constituted racial discrimination.370 The plaintiff con-
tended that adverse impact analysis could be applied to subjective 
decisions where no particular tests or other objective criteria were 
involved.371 
A majority of the Court agreed that subjective employment 
decisions were susceptible to analysis under the adverse impact theory 
because discretionary decisions, while not intended to discriminate, 
might nevertheless discriminate as a result of lingering stereotypes 
and prejudices.372 The Court also noted that, if adverse impact 
analysis was not applied to subjective decisions, employers could 
simply circumvent the mandates of Griggs by replacing objective tests 
with ill-defined, subjective criteria.373 
However, the Court could not agree on what evidentiary stan-
dards should apply when reviewing adverse impact claims directed at 
subjective decision-making. A plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor, 
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Scalia, noted the 
difficulty in providing Griggs-type "validation" of discretionary, and 
often subtle and complex, employment decisions. 374 Especially when 
statistical comparisons work against the employer, a danger would 
exist that the employer might resort to quotas to guard against 
366. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1987). The 
district court's rejection of the adverse treatment claims was left undisturbed. 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649 n.4. 
367. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649. 
368. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
369. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649-50. 
370. Watson, 487 U.S. at 982-83. 
371. [d. at 982-84. Both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit examined the claim 
using adverse treatment analysis. [d. at 983-84. 
372. [d. at 990-91. In Watson, evidence was presented that the plaintiff was told 
at one point that "the teller position was a big responsibility with 'a lot of 
money ... for blacks to have to count.'" [d. at 990. It is also noteworthy 
that there is sometimes a fine line between subjective and objective criteria. 
For example, many "objective" employment tests will involve subjective ele-
ments. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1304 (E.D.N.C. 1987). This 
would be especially true when tests include "assessment center" concepts. See 
supra note 152. 
373. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. 
374. [d. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
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adverse impact attacks. 375 Owing to this concern, the plurality pro-
vided what it called "a fresh and somewhat closer examination of 
the constraints that operate to keep that analysis within its proper 
bounds. "376 
These "constraints" require the plaintiff first to identify a 
specific employment practice, rather than show a statistical disparity 
in the workforce.377 Second, the plaintiff must show a causal rela-
tionship between the identified practice and a statistically· significant 
adverse impact on a protected group.378 It was unclear from this 
opinion how a plaintiff could meet its burden when the employer 
uses a battery of subjective considerations which are not clearly 
defined and which have vague, highly discretionary criteria.379 
The plurality made clear that the employer need only defend by 
showing a business necessity, which appears to be a less onerous task 
than validation of a test. 380 Significantly, the employer never bears 
the burden of proof, but only a burden of producing evidence that 
its practices are based on legitimate business needs. 3s1 It is unclear 
how minimal this burden is intended to be. 
Although he agreed with the general proposition that disparate 
impact analysis should be applied to subjective employment deci-
sions,382 Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, argued that the plurality had essentially 
transformed adverse treatment analysis into adverse impact analy-
sis. 383 Justice Blackmun focused primarily on the plurality's refusal 
to shift the burden of proof to the employer.384 Justice Blackmun 
also expressed concern regarding the "causation" requirement im-
375. [d. at 992-93 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Such a fear is not purely speculative. 
Even in cases examining objective tests that resulted in adverse impact, em-
ployers have resorted (or attempted to resort) to shortcuts in order to stave 
off challenges. See, e.g., supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (post-test 
"bottom line" adjustments); supra notes 219-226 and accompanying text (post-
test banding). 
376. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
377. [d. (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
378. [d. at 994-95 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Since the Court specifically used the 
term "protected group," it is unclear whether such analysis would apply equally 
to reverse discrimination claims. But see supra note 237. 
379. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1009-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
380. [d. at 997 (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
381. [d. (O'Connor, J., plurality). 
382. [d. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
383. [d. at 1001-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
384. [d. at 1000-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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posed by the plurality.38S In any event, Watson failed to establish 
clear guidelines endorsed by a majority of the Court for evaluating 
allegations of adverse impact due to subjective decisions. 
Wards Cove provided an affirmation of the Watson plurality 
decision by a majority of the Court.386 In Wards Cove, the Court 
withdrew from prior acceptance of statistics alone as a basis for 
adverse impact. Further, the language of Wards Cove could be read 
to extend this analysis to objective employment criteria, the genesis 
of which appeared in the Watson plurality. 
In finding that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case 
of discrimination in hiring noncannery workers, the Ninth Circuit 
had compared the percentage of minority workers in the cannery 
workforce with the percentage in the noncannery workforce. 387 The 
Supreme Court rejected this approach because there had been no 
showing that the cannery workers were qualified for noncannery 
jobs. Instead, the Court indicated that the absence of minorities in 
non cannery positions could be due to the dearth of qualified minority 
applicants.388 Furthermore, the Court found an overrepresentation of 
minorities in cannery jobs because the employees were supplied by a 
predominantly nonwhite union. 389 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court remanded the case to 
the district court for further inquiry to determine whether some other 
indicia of adverse impact may be found in any of Wards Cove's 
employment practices.390 Before doing so, however, the Court offered 
standards for conducting that review. It is in this discussion that a 
majority of the Court affirmed the Watson plurality. 
The Wards Cove Court began by explicitly affirming Justice 
O'Connor's statement in Watson that the "plaintiff's burden ... 
goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities. "391 
Turning the Connecticut v. TeaP92 rejection of "bottom line" analysis 
385. [d. at 1006-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
386. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Watson decision. [d. at 981. The 
Wards Cove majority was composed of the Watson plurality with the. addition 
of Justice Kennedy. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
387. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51. 
388. [d. at 651-52. Noncannery jobs included accountants, electricians, doctors, and 
engineers. [d. at 651. Although some noncannery jobs were unskilled and were 
similar in skill requirements to cannery jobs, it did not affect the Court's 
analysis. [d. This analysis ties in with the causal connection analysis because, 
unlike the inquiry of Griggs and its progeny, a reason for the absence of 
minorities in the jobs must now be shown, i.e., causality must be established. 
389. [d. at 654. 
390. [d. at 655. 
391. [d. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality». 
392. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
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on its head, the Court stated that a "Title VII plaintiff does not 
make out a case of disparate impact simply by showing that, 'at the 
bottom line,' there is racial imbalance in the work force," rather, a 
causal relationship must be shown between a specific practice and 
discriminatory effects. 393 
Assuming that the plaintiffs are able to make out a prima facie 
case, the employer must demonstrate a business justification.394 As 
the plurality in Watson stated, and as the Wards Cove majority 
affirmed, however, the burden of proof does not shift to the em-
ployer . 395 Interestingly, the Court observed that if the employer 
demonstrates a business necessity, the plaintiffs may still show that 
other devices would serve the same purposes, thereby proving the 
employers were using their tests "merely as a 'pretext' for discrimi-
nation. "396 This implies that the burden to show less discriminatory 
means was in some way governed by the more difficult pretext 
requirement. 397 In addition, the opinion contained an implicit defer-
ence to employers' decisions when it stated that "[cJourts are gen-
erally less competent than employers to restructure business 
practices."398 Significantly, the Wards Cove analysis was not limited 
to subjective job decisions. The opinion specifically identified the 
objective job criteria in question.399 Yet the Court made no attempt 
to reconcile its decision with Griggs, which required no causation 
between the employment practice and the disparate impact. Wards 
Cove could conceivably be distinguished from Griggs because the 
lower court's decision in Wards Cove was based on improper statis-
tical comparisons. Also, the causation requirement may mean only 
that a particular employment practice be singled out for attack, 
393. [d. In Connecticut v. Teal, the Court held that a racially neutral work force 
does not immunize an employer against specific acts of discrimination. See 
supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. 
394. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. 
395. [d. 
396. [d. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975». 
However, Albemarle was not a disparate treatment case involving the "pretext" 
element, but rather involved employment tests. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 427-28. 
The reference in Albemarle to pretext came via a quote from McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 
425. Immediately following the McDonnell Douglas reference, the Albemarle 
Court stated that "£i]n the present case, however, we are concerned only with 
the question whether Albemarle has shown its tests to be job related." [d. 
397. The pretext evidence will often be the same as that presented to establish a 
prima facie case. At the prima facie stage, however, the plaintiff need only 
meet a lower threshold requirement; at the pretext stage, he must convince the 
trier of fact. 
398. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 578 (1978». 
399. [d. at 647-48. 
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rather than requiring a showing of exactly what it is about that 
practice that discriminates. However, two segments of dicta in Wards 
Cove indicate otherwise. 
First, the Court clearly indicated that the absence of minorities 
may be due to the lack of qualified minority applicants. 400 However, 
there is no indication as to how a court should determine who is a 
qualified applicant. Arguably, if an applicant fails the employer's 
employment test-perhaps the very test under attack-the applicant 
may be deemed unqualified.401 Arguably the dicta in Wards Cove 
may allow the existence of this circular reasoning to justify this type 
of employment criteria. 
Second, Wards Cove specifically stated that a failure to achieve 
a "bottom line" racial balance alone did not make out a case of 
adverse impact. 402 This single statement seems to significantly under-
mine Griggs and its progeny. If mere racial imbalance no longer will 
establish a prima facie case, then one must ponder just what will 
establish a plaintiff's case. 
In the context of Wards Cove, the only conclusion to be drawn 
is that the plaintiff must explain why an identified practice causes 
discrimination, i.e., he must show causation. The import of this 
decision will most likely become apparent in the course of its appli-
cation to future situations. A particular question, and the final topic 
of this analysis, is the effect Wards Cove may have on claims of 
reverse discrimination. 
E. A New Standard For Reverse Discrimination: The Marriage of 
Croson and Wards Cove 
Whether the 1988 term of the Supreme Court represents a time 
of major upheaval in discrimination law, or whether the potentially 
landmark language of Croson and Wards Cove will be interpreted 
narrowly so as to reduce their impact, remains to be seen. However, 
the stage most certainly is set for what could be a redefinition of 
discrimination law. This is true not only because of the impact of 
the two decisions on their own, but because of a new analysis that 
could be accomplished by a synthesis of the standards articulated in 
Croson and Wards Cove. 
The focus of such re-analysis should be in the realm of reverse 
discrimination cases. Croson, in rejecting societal discrimination as 
a justification for an affirmative action program, required a finding 
400. [d. at 651-52. 
401. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the Court's mandated deference 
to employer judgment regarding the business necessity of a particular practice. 
See id. at 661. 
402. [d. at 656-57. 
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of particular instances of discrimination.403 The next question is what 
standard should be applied to a finding of such prerequisite discrim-
ination. It is at this point that Wards Cove, with its "causality" 
requirement, may be invoked. 
At the outset, a brief discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 404 is warranted. While the Act reverses the burden of proof 
holdings of Watson and Wards Cove,40S the provisions do not address 
Wards Cove's language in reference to causation. The Act's findings 
make a reference to Wards Cove's weakening the scope and effect-
iveness of federal civil rights protection.406 Other provisions of the 
1991 Act, however, indicate that the changes effectuated relate to 
reapportioning the burdens of proof as to job relation and business 
necessity. 
Section 3, addressing the purposes of the Act, specifically refers 
to the desire of Congress to codify "the concepts of 'business 
necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Griggs v. Duke Power CO."407 The provisions do not address Wards 
Cove's causation analysis, and Croson is mentioned nowhere in the 
Act. Rather, the Act seems more designed to actually reinforce the 
kind of causality requirement discussed herein. Section 105, for 
example addressing disparate impact, states: 
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular em-
ployment practice causes a disparate impact as described in 
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demon-
strate that each particular challenged employment practice 
causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining 
403. See supra notes 338-340 and accompanying text. 
404. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1992). 
405. Id. at § 105(k)(l)(A), which states: 
(k)(I)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact 
is established under the title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent 
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice 
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment 
practice. 
In addition, subsection (C) states "The demonstration referred to by subpar-
agraph A(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, 
with respect to the concept of 'alternate employment practice.'" June 4, 1989 
was the day before Wards Cove was decided. 
406. Id. at § 2(2). See also § 3(3) (reference to confirming statutory guidelines for 
the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII). 
407. Id. at § 3(2). 
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party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a 
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of 
separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be 
analyzed as one employment practice. 
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employ-
ment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the 
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such 
practice is required by business necessity. 408 
The Act goes on to state: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respon-
dent, in connection with the selection or referral of appli-
cants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust 
the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise 
alter the results of employment related tests on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.409 
This provision appears to be aimed at the sort of post-test manipu-
lations discussed supra. Rarely are such measures used to disadvan-
tage minorities; rather, they are more commonly a part of a perceived 
affirmative action program, aimed at remedying observed statistical 
disparities. Limiting these measures is consistent with a requirement 
that actual causes of discrimination be identified, because once 
identified such causes may be eliminated, a desirable alternative to 
superficial ad hoc repairs. 
The relevant portions41O of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 focus 
more on the shifting burdens than on requirements of causation, and 
do not address discrimination claims of non-minorities. 411 Therefore, 
there is little in the 1991 Act to delimit or define the cumulative 
effect of Wards Cove and Croson. 
, 
408. Id. at § 105(1)(B)(i) and (ii) (emphasis added). See also language of § 
105(k)(1)(A)(i), supra note 405. 
409. Id. at § 106(1). 
410. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 addresses numerous other issues, such as the 
expansion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 's coverage (sec. 101); compensatory and punitive 
damages in cases of intentional discrimination (sec. 102); and the limiting of 
subsequent challenges to consent decrees (sec. 108), apparently aimed at mod-
ifying the effect of Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), discussed supra 
notes 297-307 and accompanying text. 
411. Indeed, it is questionable how the burden of proof provisions would affect 
"reverse discrimination" claims. The defendant's burden to prove a business 
necessity of a race-driven process may be impossible, particularly in light of 
the accompanying provisions of § 105(1), discussed supra notes 407-408 and 
accompanying text. However the burden is shifted, it is not likely to make the 
reverse discrimination plaintiff's task any more difficult than it was before the 
passage of the Act. 
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While no cases to date have specifically observed the prospect 
of such a linking together of Croson and Wards Cove,412 a two-
pronged hypothetical application of this analysis is helpful in illus-
trating what effect it may have on the future of affirmative action 
programs and reverse discrimination litigation. For example, in Ho-
ward v. McLucas,413 the Eleventh Circuit addressed a challenge to a 
consent decree which called for 240 race conscious promotions to 38 
target positions.414 The consent decree resulted from a prior lawsuit 
alleging various statistical disparities between blacks and whites. 415 
These statistical comparisons were particularized and were much more 
specific than any generalized societal discrimination. 
In rejecting the intervenors' challenges to the consent decree, 
the court made several observations concerning findings of past 
discrimination: 
Before a public employer such as the government embarks 
on an affirmative action program, it must have "convincing 
evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must 
have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there 
has been prior discrimination." . . . [W]hen a public em-
ployer's affirm~tive action program or a consent decree 
providing race-conscious relief is challenged as unconstitu-
tional, the district court "must make a factual determination 
that the [public] employer had a strong basis in evidence 
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. "416 
Once the public employer "introduces its statistical proof 
as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby supplying the 
[district] court with the means for determining that [it] had 
a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appro-
priate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority [employees] to 
prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden 
of persuading the [district court] that the [public employer's] 
evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination 
412. See infra notes 413-429 and accompanying text. 
413. 871 F.2d 1000 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1990). The opinion 
was dated April 27, 1989, prior to Wards Cove, but subsequent to Croson, 
which was decided January 23, 1989. 
414. Howard, 871 F.2d at 1003. 
415. For example, the average grade of white employees from 1973 to 1975 was 2.5 
grades higher than that of blacks. Although blacks comprised 150/0 of the work 
force, 86% of janitors were black and 81 % of laborers were black. [d. at 
1002. Blacks also received lower supervisory ratings, and standard deviation 
analysis showed a lower promotion rate. [d. at 1002-03. 
416. [d. at 1006-07 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 
(1986) (Powell, J.». 
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and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on 
the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently 'narrowly 
tailored." '417 
Based on this analysis, the Howard court concluded that the statistical 
disparities which existed between blacks and whites were a sufficient 
predicate for the employer's voluntary agreement to the terms of the 
consent decree.418 
Had there been no Wards Cove opinion, the analysis in Howard 
would probably be complete. The prior findings of discrimination 
were specific. The race-conscious promotions were narrowly tailored 
because they were aimed at remedying a particular number of pro-
motions that according to standard deviation analysis should have 
gone to blacks. 
However, after Wards Cove, a second step must be added to 
the analysis. This step requires a showing that not only were there 
statistical disparities along racial lines in prior employnient decisions, 
but that these disparities were the result of some specific discrimi-
natory practice.419 Thus, if Howard had been decided after Wards 
Cove, the court arguably could not have satisfied itself with the mere 
observation of statistical disparities. Rather, it would have been 
required to probe deeper to ascertain that some discriminatory factor 
caused the statistical disparities before accepting them as a basis for 
voluntary affirmative action. 
This hypothesis has not been tested or applied in any cases 
reported to this point. In Evans v. City of Evanston,420 the Seventh 
Circuit remanded a case dealing with physical agility tests for further 
consideration in light of Wards Cove. The focus of the remand, 
however, was on the city meeting its burden of production of a 
business necessity. 42J Additionally, many courts have cited Wards 
417. Id. at 1006-07. (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment». 
418. Id. at 1000. There were no other bases for the allegation of prior discrimination. 
419. See supra notes 391-393 and accompanying text. While there was also reference 
to the questionable nature of statistical disparities alone in the Croson decision, 
those statements may have been distinguishable prior to Wards Cove as applying 
to situations" where special q"ualifications were required. See supra note 359 and 
accompanying text. No such qualifier was discussed in the Wards Cove opinion. 
420. 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989). 
421. Id. at 384, 386. Such tests may survive a causation requirement because it may 
be clearly demonstrated that a difference in physical strength exists between 
the sexes. However, this may not constitute a business necessity. A number of 
other cases have also cited Wards Cove for its "burden" analysis. See Williams 
v. Giant Eagle Mkts., Inc., 883 F.2d 1184, 1192 (3d Cir. 1989); Bartek v. 
Urban Dev. Auth., 882 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1989); Allen v. Seidman, 881 
F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 
309, 313 (6th Cir. 1989); Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 723 F. 
Supp. 570, 574 (D. Kan. 1989). 
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Cove for its discussion regarding the need to compare appropriate 
groups of employees when searching for adverse impact. 422 
In Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris,423 one of the few opinions 
addressing reverse discrimination after Wards Cove, the Sixth Circuit 
vacated a lower court decision and remanded the case for further 
consideration in accordance with Croson, but it made no mention 
of Wards Cove. In American Subcontractors Ass'n v. Atlanta,424 a 
pre- Wards Cove decision, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down 
a minority set-aside program under Croson, and it included language 
that would certainly be consistent with Wards Cove's causality re-
quirement: 
Witnesses for the city, when examined about these studies, 
suggested a host of non-racial factors affecting the under-
utilization of black contractors such as: lack of insurance 
and bonding capability, lack of cash flow because "the city 
doesn't pay very swiftly," and practices of not making 
information available to all bidders prior to contracting. It 
is likely that these factors face a member of any racial 
group attempting to establish a new business enterprise. 425 
Probably the case which has come the closest to recognizing an 
analytical interaction between Croson and Wards Cove was United 
States v. City of Buffalo.426 In City of Buffalo, the plaintiff-inter-
venors challenged the continued viability of court-ordered hiring 
goals.427 The court noted that the basis of the attack was the two 
recent decisions in Croson and Wards Cove.428 The court also pro-
vided further discussion of the need to refer to these two cases in 
regard to decisions of when the hiring goals must terminate. In City 
422. See Edwards v. Johnson County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (4th 
Cir. 1989); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 773 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 
558, 562 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 
1430 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 532 (E.D. 
La. 1989); Harris v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 562 
A.2d 625, 632 (D.C. 1989); Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc. v. West Virginia Human 
Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 88, 91 (W. Va. 1989). Only Guyan hinted at any 
causality requirement, stating that a plaintiff makes his case by "identifying a 
particular hiring practice that has caused statistical underrepresentation." [d. 
423. No. 87-5588 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1989). See also Podberesky v. Kirwan, No. 91-
2577, slip op. at 9 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 1992) (rejecting a reference to the sheer 
number of black students enrolled as a basis for the present vestiges of 
discrimination necessary to justify a race-driven scholarship program). 
424. 376 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1989). 
425. American Subcontractors, 376 S.E.2d at 665. 
426. 721 F. Supp. 463 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 
427. [d. at 464-65. 
428. [d. at 465. 
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of Buffa/o, it is more likely that the plaintiff-intervenors were citing 
the two cases for their analysis of the need to compare relevant 
populations, rather than asserting an application of a causation 
requirement to findings of discrimination required by Croson. 
Therefore, while a number of cases have addressed a causation 
requirement in light of Wards Cove, none has applied the requirement 
to reverse discrimination cases. Since the significant change in the 
law created by Croson and Wards Cove has resulted in prior case 
law providing minimal guidance regarding the impact of these cases,429 
support must be found elsewhere for the hypothesis that Wards Cove 
causality may be integrated into the Croson analysis. A more com-
plete discussion of each step in the analysis is warranted. 
1. The Wards Cove Causation Requirement 
The underlying premise of the proposition that Wards Cove 
creates an interactive analytical result with Croson, is that Wards 
Cove does indeed impose a causation requirement when reviewing 
evidence of discrimination. The Court's discussion of causation in 
Wards Cove certainly points to a conclusion that the Court intended 
causation to be as demanding a requirement as the term implies.430 
In addition, several cases have addressed "causation" in accor-
dance with the Wards Cove decision. Some of these cases focus on 
a requirement that a specific discriminatory employment practice be 
identified, which may in fact be less stringent than a true causation 
requirement. For example; in Crump v. Du/mison, Inc.,431 the District 
Court for the Middle District of Georgia noted that the "plaintiff 
must first identify 'the specific employment practice that is chal-
lenged." '432 However, the court also rejected "bottom line" disparity, 
and it noted that "the plaintiff has failed to offer statistical evidence 
of sufficient kind or degree to establish that the practice(s) in question 
has caused or resulted in fewer blacks than whites participating in 
on-the-job training opportunities. "433 This statement may be viewed 
more as an indictment of the statistics produced rather than as a 
failure of causation per se, especially in light of the fact that the 
429. See, e.g., Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1006 (lith Cir. 1989) (noting 
shortly before Wards Cove was decided that the "Supreme Court has yet to 
establish the standard by which to review equal protection challenges to 
governmental affirmative action programs"); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n 
v. Fiedler, 707 F. Supp. 1016, 1022 (W.O. Wis. 1989) (noting that cases decided 
before Croson were of "limited usefulness"). 
430. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490, U.S. 642, 656 (1989). 
431. 714 F. Supp. 1200 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
432. Id. at 1205 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality». 
433. Id. at 1205. 
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court's use of the verb "resulted. "434 Likewise, in Lowe v. Commack 
Union Free School District,43S the Second Circuit noted that it was 
questionable whether a discriminatory practice had been identified.436 
The court went on, however, to point out that even if a practice had 
been identified there was no showing that the practice caused any 
exclusion of applicants for jobs.437 
A number of other cases have articulated a causation requirement 
which is clearly not tied to a mere need to identify a particular 
discriminatory practice. For example, in Harris v. Lyng,438 the District 
Court for the District of Columbia noted that, notwithstanding the 
potential for discrimination by an all-white Personnel Assignment 
Committee, the plaintiff "failed to show the necessary causal con-
nection between the [committee's] actions and any claimed discrim-
ination."439 In EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,440 the 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida noted that there 
was inadequate proof that the bar against hiring persons with criminal 
convictions "caused the alleged disparities between races. "441 
If the Wards Cove causation requirement is as strict as these 
cases have interpreted it to be, then it appears to overrule the Griggs 
standard. Wards Cove, however, made no mention of Griggs. An 
explanation for this seemingly troublesome result may be found in a 
more careful reading of Griggs. Nowhere in Griggs did the Court 
offer any particular guidance for determining adverse impact. Instead, 
it simply acknowledged the existence of such a cause of action.442 In 
Griggs, the Court did imply that causation was not at issue because 
it rejected a high school diploma requirement and the use of general 
intelligence tests.443 The effect of a diploma requirement, however, 
may be readily ascertained by observing the percentage of minorities 
without diplomas in the relevant work force, thereby establishing 
. that the diploma requirement "causes" a discriminatory outcome. 
Furthermore, the Court made reference to its prior findings that 
because of historically inferior education levels for blacks, certain 
434. [d. 
435. 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026 (1990). 
436. [d. at 1370. 
437. [d. at 1370-71; see also Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 
908, 912 (4th Cir. 1989); Lu v. Woods, 717 F. Supp. 886, 890 (D.D.C. 1989). 
438. 717 F. Supp. 870 (D.D~C. 1989). 
439. [d. at 875 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 
(1989». 
440. 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
441. [d. at 751. To some extent, this may be the result of a lack of adequate 
statistical information. See also Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 885 F.2d 
804, 811 (lIth Cir. 1989) (subjective criteria for railroad supervisor position). 
442. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
443. See id. 
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tests relating to educational levels may be discriminatory. 444 
If Griggs did not address what kind of showing must be made 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; i.e., causation or· 
mere observable discrepancies, it is properly limited to holding that 
discrimination may be established without producing evidence of a 
discriminatory intent.445 Consistent with Griggs, a plaintiff may show 
discrimination without intent, but now must show the cause of 
discrimination.446 
This is not to say that a causation requirement would not have 
a significant impact on employment discrimination law. In the realm 
of an adverse treatment case which relies on specific indicia of 
discriminatory intent, as opposed to consequences from which im-
plications may be drawn,447 Wards Cove may have minimal impor-
tance. An adverse treatment case which focuses on particular 
discriminatory acts will, by its nature, point toward the "cause" of 
the discriminatory outcome, especially when anecdotal evidence is 
involved. 
A greater likelihood of a shift in analysis exists in adverse 
treatment cases relying on either the McDonnell Doug/as analysis448 
or pattern or practice analysis.449 In the McDonnell Doug/as analysis, 
no clearly articulated reason for the employment action exists. Rather, 
intentional discrimination is presumed by virtue of the fact that an 
applicant was qualified and was passed over for hiring or promo-
tion.450 In such a case, no evidence of a particular cause or causal 
relationship is presented, and even evidence that an employer's alleged 
justification for the action is pretextual will not tend to demonstrate 
causality. Similarly, pattern or practice analysis is aimed at showing 
discriminatory effects, rather than causes, and like adverse impact 
analysis, it is particularly reliant on statistical comparisons.451 There-
fore, the effect of adding a causation element to the McDonnell 
Doug/as and pattern or practice analyses would be significant. 
However, Wards Cove did not appear to apply to adverse 
treatment cases because it dealt with an adverse impact claim.452 In 
444. Id. at 430 (citing Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (involving 
literacy tests». General intelligence tests, however, are intended to operate 
independently from education experience. See Gottfredson & Sharf, Foreword, 
Fairness in Employment Testing, 33 J. Voc. BEHAV. 225 (1988). Therefore, 
Griggs may arguably still imply a rejection of a causality requirement. 
445. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
446. This analysis would call into question the continued viability of the EEOC 
Uniform Guidelines. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
447. See generally supra text accompanying notes 19-21. 
448. See generally supra text accompanying notes 22-27. 
449. See generally supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
450. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
451. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
452. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 646 (1989). 
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addition, several courts have rejected the application of Wards Cove 
to adverse treatment cases.4S3 Nevertheless, even if the causation 
element of Wards Cove were to be applied to adverse treatment 
cases, it may be argued that inferential adverse treatment still survives 
because the inferences serve only as evidence of discrimination, rather 
than establishing per se discrimination.4s4 Indeed, such a distinction 
may be applied to Griggs' adverse impact analysis, which would be 
consistent with the "burdens" discussion in Watson and Wards Cove. 
Further, this would also represent a kind of "fine tuning" of the 
earlier analysis. 
If Wards Cove should indeed be read to establish a causation 
requirement, then it is clear that, at the very least, it infuses a new 
element into discrimination analysis. Although implementation of a 
causation requirement is significant enough to appreciably alter a 
great deal of case law regarding employment discrimination, the 
Court provided little comment in Wards Cove to the extent of the 
decision's reach. However, valuable guidance on the effect of a 
causation requirement in employment discrimination in general, and 
reverse discrimination in particular, may be derived from examining 
the Court's decision in a manner less precise and more subtle than 
simply focusing on the language of the decision. Such an analysis 
entails a consideration of the underlying purposes the Court may 
have been attempting to achieve. 
2. Social Engineering Versus Judicial Restraint 
In the way it deals with various problems, or in declining to 
address particular questions, the Supreme Court is often in a position 
to affect issues which go beyond mere points of law and reach into 
important aspects of society. Certainly the realm of employer/em-
ployee relations is one such area that is an integral aspect of most 
peoples' lives. Employment decisions often involve intangibles and 
imponderables such as charisma, personal contacts, temperament, 
compatibility, and any array of other symbiotic elements beyond 
manageable judicial standards. Yet, these very factors may be used 
as a guise for unconstitutional discrimination, calling on the courts 
to intercede and strike a balance between social aspects of employ-
ment relations which are beyond meaningful scrutiny, and rules of 
law that compel judicial monitoring. 
How the Supreme Court intends to draw this balance may shed 
some light on the future of Wards Cove's effect on reverse discrim-
453. See Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 390 n.l (5th Cir. 1989); 
West Virginia Inst. of Technology v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 
383 S.E.2d 490, 494 n.8 (W. Va. 1989). 
454. See supra note 30. 
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ination cases. If the "causation" requirement is intended to place a 
greater burden on those alleging discrimination, including the em-
ployer seeking to justify its affirmative action program, the effect is 
one of social engineering. The Court may step in to redirect societal 
relationships in a manner which, in this case, would likely favor 
nonminorities. Many employers have not only accepted affirmative 
action programs, but encourage them, viewing them as a social 
good. 455 Any attempt by the Court to set standards and draw dis-
tinctions in such cases may result in a curtailment in such programs. 
The question is whether the Court should insert itself into such 
societal relationships. 
Alternately, if Wards Cove stands for the proposition that absent 
a clear showing of some cause of discrimination the Court will defer 
to the judgment of employers, then the result is a laissez faire 
approach. Therefore, unless a clearly racial animus exists against 
either minorities or nonminorities, the courts will not direct the 
employer in its chosen employment practices. This would also include 
not getting involved in an employer's plan for affirmative action. 
While there may be merit to the laissez faire interpretation of 
how Wards Cove's causation requirement may be applied in reverse 
discrimination cases,456 most indicia point to the role of Wards Cove 
as cutting back on the legacy of Griggs and, to some extent, Title 
VII. The most significant factor is the Court's decision in Croson, 
decided several months before Wards Cove. In Croson, the Court 
noted that special qualifications may justify rejecting statistical dis-
parities.457 Croson also rejected generalized societal discrimination as 
a basis for affirmative action. 458 Such factors, difficult to measure 
and to quantify, easily could have led the Court in Croson to conclude 
that establishing a basis for affirmative action was not a task appro-
priate for the courts. Instead, in rejecting the affirmative action 
program, the Court noted that one could not assume that the 
observed disparity was not due to blacks being drawn to other 
occupations.459 
Such analysis, even put forth with the most benign intentions, 
may have the effect of perpetuating racial stereotypes. For example, 
while the Court may have been willing to assume that blacks tradi-
455. See supra note 165. 
456. For example, in both Watson and Wards Cove, the Court made reference to 
its prior acknowledgement in Furneo Constr. Corp. v. Waters that courts are 
less competent than employers to restructure business practices. See supra notes 
380 and 398 and accompanying text. 
457. In Wards Cove, the Court also identified nondiscriminatory causes for minority 
underrepresentation. See supra notes 387-389 and accompanying text. 
458. See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text. 
459. See supra note 348. 
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tionally were not drawn to the construction industry, it would have 
been instructive to observe how the Court would have dealt with a 
quota plan in a company in which a disproportionate number of 
whites were employed in jobs or occupations stereotyped as employing 
primarily blacks. Whatever the outcome of such analysis, it neces-
sarily involves the Court injecting itself into sociological decisions 
for which no readily apparent solutions exist and for which judicially 
manageable standards may be difficult to develop. Rather than 
retreating from social issues, the Croson Court expressed no reticence 
in striking down the plan. 
A second consideration regarding the Court's role involves a 
comparison of Wards Cove with situations in which the Court 
affirmatively withdrew from attempting a judicial resolution. The 
Court's occasional invocation of the doctrine of non-justiciability 
was explained by Chief Justice Hughes: 
In short, the question of a reasonable time in many cases 
would involve, as in this case it does involve, an appraisal 
of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social 
and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the 
appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice 
and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of 
judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of 
deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an 
amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these con-
ditions are appropriate for the consideration of the political 
departments of the Government. The questions they involve 
are essentially political and not justiciable. They can be 
decided by the Congress with the full knowledge and ap-
preciation ascribed to the national legislature of the political, 
social and economic conditions which have prevailed during 
the period since the submission of the amendment. 460 
Such a withdrawal from deciding nonjusticiable questions is 
particularly appropriate when the Court lacks access to the infor-
mation necessary to make a reasoned determination.461 This appears 
to be the case in determining the causes of underrepresentation of 
minorities in occupations. However, the Court has actively involved 
itself in decisions for which no clear judicial standards exist. 
In Wards Cove there was no clear indication by the Court that 
it intended to adopt a laissez faire approach to employment discrim-
460. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939). 
461. See Sharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517, 567 (1966). 
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ination issues.462 With the exception of an almost passing reference 
regarding deference to employers,463 the Court involved itself in a 
review of statistics, burdens, and labor pools.464 The Court was clear 
in its identification of the causation requirement, stating unequivo-
cally that: "[flirst is the question of causation in a disparate-impact 
case.' '465 Such an aggressive approach to judicial review is diametri-
cally opposed to those situations in which the Court has retreated 
from judicial interference because of nonminority justiciability or a 
lack of manageable standards. 
Another consideration in arguing that Wards Cove was intended 
to effect social change is the decision of the Court a week after 
Wards Cove in Martin v. Wilks.466 In Martin, the Court expanded 
the ability of individuals to challenge consent orders aimed at aiding 
minorities.467 While such a decision would not necessarily be incon-
sistent with a laissez faire approach, it certainly supports a view of 
Wards Cove and a general attitude on the part of the Supreme Court 
of favoring the reverse discrimination plaintiff. One could argue that 
because Martin deals with procedural issues, it does not address the 
underlying substance of the employment discrimination controversy. 
However, the dissenters in Martin-Justices Stevens, Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun-were the same dissenters in Wards Cove. 
Therefore, while it may be coincidence that the Justices who disagreed 
with the Wards Cove rationale also viewed the procedural issues in 
Martin differently, it appears more likely that Martin represented the 
same ideological split that was present in Wards Cove. 468 
3. New Standards in Reverse Discrimination Cases 
Assuming that the coupling of the Croson and Wards Cove 
analyses is to be applied to reverse discrimination cases, three con-
siderations regarding reverse discrimination should be addressed. 
First, how will a reverse discrimination plaintiff establish a prima 
facie case? Second, how will the burdens be apportioned throughout 
462. When the Court has declined to decide an issue, it has been explicit in indicating 
its decision not to get involved. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 
(1946) (congressional districting); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S. 118 (1912) (constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government). 
463. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989). 
464. [d. at 650-61. 
465. [d. at 656. 
466. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
467. See supra notes 297-307 and accompanying text. 
468. This conclusion is supported by the dissent's discussion of the necessity of 
whites to share the burdens necessary to redress past wrongs. Martin, 490 U.S. 
at 791-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such factors address the underlying sub-
stantive issues and should be unrelated to the procedural issue before the court. 
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the various stages of the litigation? Third, what is necessary for an 
affirmative action program to withstand scrutiny in light of the 
Wards Cove causation requirement? 
4a. The Reverse Discrimination Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case 
One consideration that has yet to be discussed is just what a 
nonminority must do to show that his employment status was affected 
(whether legally or illegally) by a race-conscious program or set of 
criteria. Wards Cove rejected mere statistical comparisons.469 Both 
the Croson and Wards Cove cases severely limited the relevancy of 
general group comparisons. 470 
Generally, the same standards apply to reverse discrimination 
cases as to other discrimination suits.471 There is no reason to assume 
that the rationale of Croson and Wards Cove should not, therefore, 
apply similarly to the nonminority plaintiff who asserts that they 
were discriminated against because of their race. Somewhat paradox-
ically, this conclusion could ultimately have the effect of forcing 
courts into a laissez-faire role. If reverse discrimination plaintiffs are 
held to a lesser standard, then courts are clearly involved in social 
engineering by actively aiding nonminorities over minorities. To the 
extent that nonminorities face the same difficulties as minorities in 
showing they were discriminated against, however, the result could 
be to allow employers greater leeway in implementing affirmative 
action programs and to decrease judicial intervention when such 
plans are at issue. 
As a practical matter, many reverse discrimination plaintiffs may 
face little or no hurdle in demonstrating that they were adversely 
affected by race-conscious hiring. Many affirmative action plans are 
the result of expressly articulated policies, such as minority set-aside 
programs, explicit quotas, or situations in which test scores have 
been manipulated to lessen or eliminate adverse impact. 
More difficult questions may arise concerning employment de-
cisions. If employers are allowed to escape judicial scrutiny by 
implementing sufficiently subjective criteria, a careful employer may 
maintain its affirmative action program under the cloak of vague, 
ill-defined criteria.472 On the other hand, it may be argued that any 
consideration of race as a factor, unless as a specific remedy for 
specific prior discrimination, is impermissible. Consideration of a 
person's nonminority status as a reason to hire or promote is equally 
inappropriate. Therefore, the same standards should apply to reverse 
469. See supra notes 386-389 and accompanying text. 
470. See supra notes 339, 388-389 and accompanying text. 
471. See supra note 237. 
472. See supra note 22; supra notes 266, 372 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination as to discrimination. Accordingly, even generalized 
criteria such as those in the Harvard plan473 may be subject to attack. 
4b. Burdens in Reverse Discrimination Cases 
Closely related to the importance of the establishment of a prima 
facie case is defining where the burdens lie. Both Watson and Wards 
Cove indicate that the burden of proof always remains with the 
plaintiff. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the same should be 
true in a reverse discrimination case. An underlying and subtle 
distinction that exists in reverse discrimination cases, however, may 
affect how the usual apportioning of burdens may operate. Partic-
ularly after the 1988 Term, the employer has only to articulate a 
business reason for its employment decision.474 It may be argued in 
the reverse discrimination case that the employer has only to "artic-
ulate" past discrimination to justify its affirmative action, with the 
burden remaining on the plaintiff. However, this premise could also 
be translated into a requirement that in a reverse discrimination case, 
the plaintiff challenging the plan need only ar:ticulate a nondiscrim-
inatory basis for the employment practice which the employer pre-
viously believed to be discriminatory. This argument could then be 
valid to show pretext on the part of the employer and therefore 
invalidate the plan. 
An illustration of these two possibilities may be helpful. The 
challenged situation involves an affirmative action plan calling for 
minority promotions on a one-for-one basis with nonminority pro-
motions. The basis for the plan is a past statistical underrepresen-
tation of minorities in the positions involved and a reliance on 
promotional ratings from predominantly white supervisors. If the 
burden is'to remain with the nonminority plaintiff who is challenging 
the plan, he must prove that the prior underrepresentation was caused 
by some factor which was unrelated to race and that lower supervisory 
evaluations for minorities were directly attributable to actual per-
formance. This would call on the reverse discrimination plaintiff to 
prove what the employer must only articulate in a traditional dis-
crimination case. Once placed in this framework, it appears more 
likely that such a burden of proof should not rest with the reverse 
discrimination plaintiff. Particular support for this conclusion is 
found in the Supreme Court's role as an engineer of social change 
and particularly the manner in which the Court addressed the situ-
ation in Croson. The rejection of population comparisons and the 
assumption that blacks may have been drawn to other jobs leads one 
473. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19, 321-24 (1978) 
(Powell, J., plurality). 
474. See supra note 394. 
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to conclude that a similar analysis in the above example would result 
in a minimal burden being placed on the reverse discrimination 
plaintiff. 
In such a situation, the reverse discrimination plaintiff must only 
articulate a possible nondiscriminatory "cause" of the observed 
discrepancies. Examples may be a lack of interest in the job,47S a 
need for subjective decision-making because the job is one of public 
trust,476 the existence of a test validation,477 or, in the extreme, poor 
judgment by the employer which is not discriminatory but is in an 
area in which the courts should not interfere.478 Since there is no 
requirement in a reverse discrimination case of showing that alternate 
employment practices may have existed,479 such a showing by the 
employer would be insufficient to justify its program. Thus, the 
employer bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that the 
discriminatory results had a discriminatory cause, as required by 
Wards Cove. In this manner, the framework discussed above is 
maintained when examined in light of the shifting burdens. 
The employer is then placed in the difficult position of dem-
onstrating that it acted improperly in past employment decisions. 
This may range from demonstrating a discriminatory animus480 to 
showing lack of care in preparing a test; this amounts to arguing 
that the employer's prior policies were mere pretexts for discrimi-
nation. 
4c. Evidence that Will Justify the Affirmative Action Program 
Assuming that employers bear the burden of proving discrimi-
nation that is an adequate predicate to the affirmative action plan, 
the final question is what kind of evidence will sufficiently support 
such a showing. Croson made clear that the Court rejects general 
societal discrimination as a basis. Wards Cove paved the way for a 
requirement that a causal relationship be shown between an employ-
ment practice and a discriminatory outcome before affirmative action 
is instituted. I( the implementation of these standards results in a 
475. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) 
(construction industry). 
476. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 1985) (police 
officers). 
477. See generally supra text accompanying notes 148-156. 
478. See, e.g., supra note 144 (employment tests). However this deference could be 
read to include deference to the employer's decision regarding the need for 
affirmative action. See generally text accompanying notes 445-459. 
479. See supra note 162. 
480. It is unclear what would prevent an employer from producing witnesses to 
assert racial biases in prior decision-making, even in situations where such bias 
had not in fact existed. 
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requirement that cannot be met by employers, however, it raises 
doubts as to whether such a stringent standard is workable and 
whether such a standard was what was truly envisioned by the courts. 
Therefore, such an analysis is not just an academic exercise, but it 
is a necessary element in testing the hypothesis that calls for the 
marriage between Croson and Wards Cove. 
A number of methods for demonstrating adverse impact may 
satisfy the Wards Cove causality requirement. For example, mUltiple 
regression analysis4tll may satisfy a causality requirement. This is true 
not so much because such an analysis identifies a discriminatory 
"cause" but because it eliminates other nondiscriminatory elements 
as accounting for the apparently discriminatory result. By process of 
elimination, only the discriminatory "cause" remains. The analysis 
will then truly identify the degree of certainty with which the "cause" 
can be said to be related to the effect. 482 
Standard deviation analysis483 is similar to that part of multiple 
regression analysis which calculates the improbability that the result 
was due to chance. However, it does not specifically eliminate other 
nondiscriminatory causes of the outcome. While such an analysis is 
stamped with a scientific imprimatur, it may not meet a true causality 
requirement. If differences in hiring or promotional statistics are due 
to differences in labor pools or job interest, for example, standard 
deviation may not reflect such a result. Although such generalizations 
may perpetuate stereotypes, it may nonetheless be true that some 
ethnic groups are uninterested in certain job categories because of 
differing socialization or background. Even more innocent causes 
may create an appearance of discrimination. 
A hypothetical may demonstrate the point. Suppose an inner 
city area which is predominately hispanic. Some of the younger 
generation may be upwardly mobile; they may tend to enter profes-
sions and leave the city. Others may be more interested in perpetu-
ating the family businesses and thus remain in the inner city. The 
result may be a statistical underrepresentation of hispanics in the 
professions in the city that exists not because of discriminatory 
reasons but because of a social trend in which those who are upwardly 
mobile leave the city. If the statistical analysis accounts for such 
481. See generally supra text accompanying notes 125-130. 
482. The high probability identified by multiple regression analysis really does no 
more than isolate a discriminatory cause and demonstrate a correlation between 
the cause and the outcome. While the same may be said of EEOC's "four-
fifths rule," see generally supra text accompanying notes 95-99, multiple 
regression analysis injects an element of scientific assurance that, in the long 
run, may make it acceptable. 
483. See generally supra text accompanying notes 117-124. 
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factors, it should survive. Otherwise, it suffers from the possible 
infirmities that were fatal in Croson and Wards Cove. 
Another example of the type of analysis that should pass a 
causality test is implicated in United States v. City of Buffalo.484 
Although City of Buffalo found a police examination invalid under 
Title VII (albeit under pre- Wards Cove standards), it did make 
reference to language analysis by a linguistic expert. 485 Although the 
purpose was to validate the test, a similar linguistic analysis may be 
used to demonstrate a bias against minorities which is not sufficiently 
business-related. This same approach is demonstrated by an employ-
ment test in which applicants are required to unscramble four letters 
to spell the correct answer "coat;" the word "taco" is incorrect. 
The test may discriminate against hispanics because they may tend 
to pick "taco" as the answer. 486 . 
A final consideration regarding this issue is the role that prior 
court orders or court-approved consent decrees have in justifying 
affirmative action. In Croson, the Supreme Court discussed what 
prior findings were required before race-conscious remedies could be 
employed.487 The question remains as to whether prior judicial orders 
or findings will satisfy the requirements. 
Unlike generalized legislative findings or conclusions by private 
employers, court decrees, especially those in contested litigation, will 
usually be the result of a more intense inquiry. In this sense, they 
will more likely survive as the basis in affirmative action programs, 
which was what was envisioned by Martin v. Wilks. However, there 
are no reasons why the admonitions of the Supreme Court in Croson 
should not apply with equal force to court-ordered relief. For ex-
ample, if a court finds only a generalized atmosphere of discrimi-
nation in a place of employment, without any particularized showing 
of injury, it may not be justified in awarding specific relief. Likewise, 
if the discriminatory impact may be demonstrated only by reference 
to group comparisons, assuming that minoritie~ are interested in the 
jobs in question, court-ordered affirmative action may not be justi-
fied. 
484. 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). 
485. [d. at 624. 
486. O. Buntin, Remarks at a Hearing Before the Baltimore City Council (June 14, 
1989); c/. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING 635-714 (1988) (discussing culture-
reduced test techniques). Difficult questions may be raised when the ethnic 
characteristic does indeed affect the employee's ability to perform the job. For 
example, if height or weight requirements were shown to be job-related, which 
may be possible under Wards Cove's relaxed standards, they may survive, even 
though they may be demonstrably causally related to an ethnic group. 
487. See supra notes 338-345 and accompanying text. 
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The same analysis should apply when considering Wards Cove. 
Although several opinions have indicated otherwise,488 there is no 
logical reason why a court should be excused from finding a causal 
relationship between the discrimination and the effect. Additionally, 
if an employer wishes to use a judicial finding or enter into a consent 
decree, this causation requirement should also be met. Further sup-
port may be found in the fact that affirmative action may go beyond 
what the court could require.489 Therefore, if voluntary programs are 
subject to the requirements of Croson and Wards Cove, court orders 
should also be so bound. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A great many developments and refinements in discrimination 
law have occurred since the original passage of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, particularly in the wake of Griggs v. Duke Power 
Company. What appeared to be a solid and firmly defined body of 
case law was upset in 1989 by two major decisions, Croson and 
Wards Cove. The significance of these opinions is multiplied, partic-
ularly in the realm of reverse discrimination cases, when these two 
decisions . are joined to create a single analytical framework that 
injects a causation requirement between a discriminatory act and an 
apparently discriminatory outcome in order to validate an affirmative 
action plan. While specific recognition of such an approach has yet 
to emerge in current case law, the hypothesis is supported by the 
language of numerous decisions, general tenets of justiciability, and 
the effect of such a change. Even though these decisions may have 
reordered much of the prior law, a causation requirement does not 
create an unattainable standard. It still requires a framework of 
proof and burdens consistent with prior case law. The prospect of a 
true emergence of an analytical marriage between Croson and Wards 
Cove is therefore manageable. Whether the courts will take such a 
course can only be ascertained with the passage of time. 
488. u.s. v. City of Buffalo, 721 F. Supp. 463, 467 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) stated that 
neither Croson nor Wards Cove "altered the broad power of federal district 
courts to implement relief that operated both retrospectively to redress past 
discrimination and prospectively to ensure that it does not recur." C/. Huguley 
v. General Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 81, 88 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (discussing 
Wards Cove in the context of consent decrees). 
489. See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 690 (6th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). 
